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Abstract 
 
The competing powers of Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to redress and reverse 
the strategic imbalance and direction of the Middle East’s regional politics. The 1979 
Iranian Revolution catapulted these two states into an embittered rivalry. The fall of 
Saddam Hussein following the 2003 U.S. led invasion, the establishment of a Shi’ite Iraq 
and the 2011 Arab Uprisings have further inflamed tensions between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have not confronted each other militarily, but rather have 
divided the region into two armed camps on the basis of political and religious ideology 
in seeking regional allies and promulgating sectarianism as they continue to exploit the 
region’s weak states in a series of proxy wars ranging from conflicts in Iraq to Lebanon. 
The Saudi-Iranian strategic and geopolitical rivalry is further complicated by a religious 
and ideological rivalry, as tensions represent two opposing aspirations for Islamic 
leadership with two vastly differing political systems. The conflict is between Saudi 
Arabia, representing Sunni Islam via Wahhabism, and Iran, representing Shi’ite Islam 
through Khomeinism. The nature of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has led many Middle East 
experts to identify their rivalry as a “New Middle East Cold War.” The Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry has important implications for regional stability and U.S. national security 
interests. Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the question: Is a cold war framework 
applicable when analyzing the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship?  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The interaction between politics and religion in the Middle East has driven the 
region into a period of intense crisis and confrontation. Out of the ashes of the Ottoman 
Empire and Western colonialism, competing powers within the region continue to redress 
and reverse the strategic imbalance and direction of the Middle East’s regional politics. 
During the past four decades, a major determinant of Middle Eastern politics has been 
Saudi-Iranian relations. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran have 
been engaged in a bitter rivalry. Their ongoing dispute and Sunni-Shi’ite proxy wars will 
continue to have important implications for regional stability and U.S. national security 
interests.    
The fall of Saddam Hussein following the 2003 U.S. led invasion, and the 
subsequent establishment of a Shi’ite Iraq, has changed the balance of power between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, increasing tensions between the rival countries to unparalleled 
heights. In their struggle for Middle East hegemony, Iran and Saudi Arabia have not 
confronted each other militarily, but rather have divided the region into two armed camps 
on the basis of political ideology. As a means of seeking regional allies and increasing 
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their power and influence in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to disseminate 
sectarianism and exploit the region’s weak states through a series of proxy wars in Iraq, 
Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Bahrain. Furthermore, Iran and Saudi Arabia’s proxy wars in 
the region, following the Arab Uprisings, provided a fertile ground for the rise of 
extremist groups such as ISIS to emerge as powerful players in the region.  
Significance of the Topic and Thesis Question 
Stability in the Middle East is integral to the national security interests of the 
United States. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s exploitation of weakened political institutions will 
have serious effects on security, stability and economic growth in the region. The 
geopolitical struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran presents an increasingly complex set 
of challenges for the Middle East.  The Saudi-Iranian rivalry is further complicated by a 
religious and ideological competition, with structural tensions representing two opposing 
aspirations for Islamic leadership that overlap with the strategic and geopolitical rivalry. 
These religious and ideological tensions encompass a competition between Saudi Arabia, 
representing Sunni Islam and its Wahhabi interpretations, and Iran, representing Shi’ite 
Islam through its Khomeini doctrines. This Sunni-Shi’ite identity and the state collective 
have fed into the bitter enmity that exists between Saudi Arabia and Iran, influencing the 
foreign policies and bilateral relations of these two nations. In turn, this rivalry is defining 
the strategic landscape of the Middle East 
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Though the competition between these two states is enduring, paying attention to 
the rivalry now is principally crucial. In order for the United States to understand the full 
implications of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, it is important to understand the relational 
dynamics between Saudi Arabia and Iran and analyze how Saudi Arabia and Iran 
politicize these tensions by supporting their proxies and encouraging sectarianism. When 
addressing the rivalry, many renowned Middle East experts have begun to identify the 
current conflicts in the Middle East as “New Middle East Cold War” between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. There are many vast and wide implications of a cold war in the Middle 
East and it is central to address how accurate a description this cold war framework is 
when analyzing the Saudi Arabian and Iranian relationship. Thus, to comprehend the 
current tensions occurring in the Middle East, this thesis seeks to address the following 
question: can the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran be framed as the new 
Middle East “cold war”?  
   Thesis Methodology and Design  
This thesis is meant bring readers an understanding of the current reality 
surrounding Middle East history, politics and identity while focusing on the Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry. In order to analyze whether Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in a cold war, this 
thesis will explore four different time periods: 1924-1979; 1979-2003; 2003-2011; 2011-
Present. These time periods will address the historical relations between the Saudis and 
Iranians prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, outline the respective goals of Saudi Arabia 
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and Iran, and how these two states are implementing their foreign policies in their quest 
for regional power and influence. Additionally, this thesis will look to comprehend the 
shift in the balance of power that occurred since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and 
the Arab Uprisings in 2011. 
This study primarily focuses on qualitative methodology, using a case study 
approach. Data will be collected based on an evaluation of primary and secondary 
sources. These published sources range from government documents, journal articles and 
scholarly books. Key information has been drawn from reports from prominent U.S. and 
foreign think tanks, newspaper articles, especially Arab newspapers in English, and an 
assortment of books by prominent observers of U.S. policy and Middle East Experts. This 
paper also uses a variety of quantitative data, analyzing data sets on war, conflict and 
economic trends.  
In this thesis, chapter two looks towards foreign policy theories on interstate 
rivalries in world politics and will provide a theoretical foundation of warfare. This thesis 
then provides an alternate way to define warfare by adding a fourth dimension, cold war. 
Using the case study of the United States and Soviet Union Cold War, this thesis 
identifies characteristics of a cold war in order to compare and contrast them to the 
conflict trends occurring in the Middle East between rival states Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
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Chapter three analyzes the rivalry within its historical context in order to 
understand just how the conflict behavior of and between Saudi Arabia and Iran is 
influenced. This chapter first focuses on the origins of schism that exists between the 
Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. It then explores how Saudi Arabia and Iran have consolidated 
and pursued state power during the years 1924-1979. Chapter three highlights the 
significant events surrounding phases of normalized bilateral relations and enmity.  
In chapter four, this thesis will demonstration how the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
altered Saudi-Iranian relations. Events following the 1979 revolution increased tensions 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran to such a degree that it locked them in a state of enduring 
enmity. Although there was a brief time period in the 1990’s where the two nations reach 
a state of détente, it was not destined to last. 
Chapter five begins with the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and examines 
how the creation of the first Arab Shi’ite state changed the balance of power between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. This chapter then seeks to identify the political, religious and 
security dimensions of the events leading up to 2011 by considering the affects of Iran’s 
nuclear pursuit and by mapping out the geography of their conflict in Iraq, Yemen, the 
Palestinian Territories, and Lebanon.  
In the sixth chapter, this study seeks to explain the intensification of the 
competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The 
ideological dimensions of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry continue to encompass the growing 
6 
 
 
 
sectarian character of political conflict in the region, as Saudi Arabia and Iran increase 
their capitalization of the weakened political institutions in the Gulf and the wider Middle 
East. This chapter will then look at the nature of the rivalry following the Arab Spring, as 
Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to fight proxy wars and institute military interventions in 
Bahrain, Syria and Yemen in order to maintain their spheres of influence in the Gulf and 
in the Levant. 
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Chapter Two: Cold War Framework 
 
 In order to understand and explain the inter-state relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran, it is fundamental to look towards foreign policy theories on interstate 
rivalries in world politics. This section will provide a theoretical foundation of warfare 
and an evolutionary approach to inter-state rivalries. Following this section, this paper 
will use the United States-Soviet Union Cold War literature as a case study to identify 
dimensions of a cold war and analyze how the current tensions in the Middle East 
compare or contrast. In order to fully consider the political history and current foreign 
policy trends of the Middle East, this thesis will also incorporate the concept of state 
identity and its role.  
Systemic Rivalries 
The evolution of geopolitics is ongoing. Powers rise, fall and shift. Such 
transitions have often coincided with warfare. The history of the nation-state has been 
fraught with conflict and violence. In the fight for sovereignty and political legitimacy, 
nations have been willing to fight for their beliefs, interests and objectives. War, here, is 
defined as sustained combat between/among military contingents involving substantial 
casualties (with the criterion being a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths). Wars can be 
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subdivided into three categories: Interstate, intrastate and extra state.1 In fact, studies of 
rivalries have shown that not only are rivalries a major component of international 
relations, but one study even found that 12 percent of the dyads account for more than 60 
percent of the total militarized disputes.2  
Most interstate conflict occurs between countries that are long-time rivals. While 
some dyads (pairs of states) are able to manage or resolve their issues, countries that have 
engaged in frequent confrontations over extended periods of times become engaged in a 
situation that is known as an “enduring rivalry.” These rivalries are dynamic and evolve 
out of multiple interactions between the two adversaries. Inter-state rivalry theory 
explains that as two adversaries accumulate a history of protracted conflict, “their rivalry 
relationship tends to become ‘locked in’ or entrenched, with future conflict becoming 
increasingly difficult to avoid…” In addition, for a rivalry to be considered enduring the 
two adversaries must be engaged in a competitive relationship over one or more interests 
and each nation must perceive the other as a significant security threat with hostile intent 
and capabilities.3 This concept of rivalry can involve a wide range of applications that 
have political, economic, social or military dimensions. Additionally, it is important to 
note that the relationship between rivals may change based on each nation’s relative 
                                                
1 Correlates of War Project, in the COW War Data, 1816 - 2007 (v4.0), accessed May 8, 
2015,http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war. 
 
2 G. Goertz and P. F. Diehl. 1993. Enduring rivalries: Theoretical constructs and empirical patterns. 
International Security Quarterly 37:147-71. 
 
3 Paul R. Hensel, 1999. An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry. Conflict Management 
and Peace Science 17, (2): 177 
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perception of threat and competiveness regarding the other. Rivalries are not static but 
rather change over time and thus may shift between states of enduring rivalry towards 
cooperative (if not peaceful) relations at any time based on their interactions.  
Enduring rivalries have traditionally led nations to resort to militarized means to 
resolve their differences. This causative viewpoint of rivalries and warfare has been 
elaborated by Carl von Clausewitz’s conceptual framework for how to think of warfare 
and strategy. The infamous 19th century military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, explained 
that war is instigated by a rational calculation to meet a political objective; war is the 
“continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means.”4  
In order to achieve the principal objective of overthrowing the enemy, the “will of 
the people” must be taken into consideration. It is only by destroying the will of the 
enemy that victory (and peace) can be achieved; “the activities of hostile agencies cannot 
be regarded as ended so long as the will of the enemy is not subdued…”5 Additionally, 
the psychology of an army’s combatants and their will to succeed must constantly be 
adhered to.  
The destruction of the enemy to achieve a political objective is, therefore, been 
predominantly accomplished by the consequent destruction of the enemy’s military 
forces via direct military action. For war to occur, policy makers believe that the best way 
to pursue a state’s goals and interests is through military means. Furthermore, once 
                                                
4 The Book of War. New York: Modern Library, 2000. 
 
5 Ibid 
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conflict becomes protracted, hostility and tensions between the two nations become 
rooted in the state’s identity and thus become embedded in the domestic politics of a 
nation and national security is defined in juxtaposition with the rival country.6 A last 
theme regarding inter-state rivalries that is important to note is that once established, 
those individuals and groups that stand to benefit the most from rivalry will see these 
rivalries as an inherent reinforcement to their positions of influence. As Paul Hensel 
explains, “In short, domestic politics seem likely to both be affected by rivalry, and to 
exert an important degree on foreign policy making in rivalry situations.”7 
Adding a Fourth dimension to Wars and Rivalries: 
Perhaps no greater rivalry had greater implications for the world than that which 
existed during the second half of the 20th century between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Warfare changes and the experiences of World War II shaped the 
transformation of how wars were fought. At the end of World War II, a bipolar world was 
created in which the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its satellite 
states engaged in the struggle for supremacy. Although they were allies during World 
War Two, by 1946 existing tensions between the Soviet Union and United States peaked 
and resulted in a globalized Cold War that lasted over four decades. The Cold War 
dominated much of Russian and American life after 1945. The United States believed 
                                                
6 Paul R. Hensel, (1998b). "Evolutionary Perspectives on Recurrent Conflict and Rivalry." Paper presented 
at the Conference on Evolutionary Perspectives on International Relations, Bloomington, IN, December 
1998. 
 
7 Ibid, 183. 
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that the American system was destined to inspire a unified international system, which 
included an open Eastern Europe. Russia, on the other hand, sought to introduce their 
brand of communism to nations and territories that they occupied at the end of World 
War II and thus viewed Eastern Europe as central to its security and power.  
The rivalry that existed between the United States and Soviet Union can not be 
classified as an inter-state war, as the political, social and economic tensions that existed 
became exacerbated to such a degree that the two nations foreign policies expanded, 
culminating in a series of both small and large wars that were fought in almost every 
corner of the world.8 During the Cold War, the superpowers intervened in domestic 
politics of both allied nations and in the bloody conflicts in the developing world where 
American and Russian surrogates (and sometimes Russian and American soldiers) would 
fight each other. These conflicts killed tens of millions of people in Korea, Vietnam, the 
Middle East, Central America and Afghanistan.9 What is important about the Cold War 
relationship in the context of inter-state rivalries is that while the rivalry that existed 
between the United States and Soviet Union qualifies as an enduring rivalry, the 
militarized disputes between the two superpowers did not involve the destruction of the 
enemy via direct military action. Additionally, the rivalry had overlapping elements of 
interstate, extra state and intra state wars. These distinctions are incredibly important to 
                                                
8 James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, eds., Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide (Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-CLIO, 2012), xiv. 
 
9 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006, 10th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2008),  1. 
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understanding not only the foreign policies of different states but also are essential in 
order to understand the implications of varying relationships in international politics. 
Thus, this paper will identify a cold war as a 4th dimension of wars and rivalries.   
While the situation between the United States and Soviet Union did not directly 
include fighting or bloodshed, it was a battle nonetheless. In most cases, the west backed 
one side while the East supported the other. In the 1940’s, it was evident that the cost of 
the Cold War to both the superpowers and to the global world would be significant. Thus, 
new characterizations of war were adopted to discuss this emerging warfare. By analogy 
with “cold” war, the term “hot war” was coined to describe open military conflict; an 
armed conflict between nations. The phrase “cold war” was originally used by George 
Orwell and in its specific context is attributed to Bernard Baruch, a past advisor to 
multiple presidents on economic and foreign policy issues. In a speech that he gave in 
1947, Baruch warned,  
Let us not be deceived-we are today in the midst of a cold war. Our enemies are to 
be found abroad and at home… The peace of the world is the hope and the goal of 
our political system; it is the despair and defeat of those who stand against us. We 
can depend only on ourselves.”10  
 
This phrase soon caught on to describe the bipolar military and diplomatic rivalry 
that existed between the nuclear superpowers. The term specifically describe the rivalry 
as confrontations that did not involve direct military battle, but that involved 
confrontations via political maneuvering, military coalitions, espionage, propaganda, 
                                                
10 Andrew Glass “Bernard Baruch Coins Term 'cold War,' April 16, 1947,” POLITICO, 4/16/2010, 1, 
accessed May17, 2015, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35862.html. 
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arms buildups, economic aid, and proxy wars between other nations.11 The Cold War era 
featured three major and prolonged conflicts in addition to the many small wars, such as 
the Korean War, which lasted from 1950-1953, the Vietnam War from 1946-1975 and 
the Afghanistan War from 1979-1989. The Cold War period also marked a time when a 
massive arms race took place, causing what many historians have indicated to be a time 
where everyday life in both the East and the West was “militarized.”12 Trillions of dollars 
were spent on advancing weaponry, building powerful defense industries and large 
standing armies. With military preparedness an essential survival tool, each side armed 
itself and its proxies to fight large-scale battles. No nation in the world remained immune 
to Cold War influences, with society, culture, the economic and international politics 
being widely affected by the costs and consequences of the Cold War.  
Cold War Theory Applied 
The Cold War that lasted between the Soviet Union and the United States was an 
all-encompassing zero-sum game. Conflict and competition between the two rival 
countries touched essentially every issue in the immediate post World War II period. It 
was a conflict that lasted four decades and its affects are still felt in present day 
international security issues. In the recent years, many Middle East experts have begun to 
identify the current rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran as part of a larger war in the 
                                                
11 "The Cold War." John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. Accessed March 26, 2015. 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/The-Cold-War.aspx.  
 
12 James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, eds., Cold War: the Essential Reference Guide (Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), ix 
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entire Middle East, with Saudi Arabia and Iran both fueling and encapsulating the Sunni-
Shi’ite conflict. While the Sunni-Shi’ite rivalry is not the root cause of the Saudi-Iranian 
rivalry, it has been politicized in such a way that it has come to reflect an older conflict 
between sects and states and is an outcome of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for regional 
hegemony.13 The classification that these experts have framed this conflict with is a cold 
war.  
Experts state that while the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran date back to the 
mid 1920’s, ultimately the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 2003 U.S. led Iraq invasion, and 
the most recent Arab Uprisings have launched the Middle East into a new cold war. For 
instance, in a Brookings Doha analysis paper published early in the Summer of 2014, 
Gregory Gause III states,  
The best framework for understanding the complicated and violent regional 
politics of the Middle East is as a cold war among a number of regional players, 
both states and non-state actors, in which Iran and Saudi Arabia play the leading 
roles. It is a cold war because these two main actors are not confronting and most 
probably will not confront each other militarily. Rather, their contest for influence 
plays out in the domestic political systems of the region’s weak states. It is a 
struggle over the direction of the Middle East’s domestic politics more than a 
purely military contest.14 
 
Other experts have also addressed this security dilemma as a cold war such as 
Daniel Serwer explains that “it’s what the US and Soviet Union were involved in [during] 
                                                
13 Toby Matthiesen, interviewed by Iran Wire, July 8, 2015. 
 
14 F. Gregory Gause III, “Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War,” Brookings Doha Center 
Publications, No. 33 of 44 (July 2014): 3, accessed February 
2015, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/22-beyond-sectarianism-cold-war-
gause/english-pdf.pdf. 
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the Cold War…”15 Roxane Farmanfarmaian, a specialist on Iran and Senior Research 
Fellow at the Global Policy Institute, posits that it’s a, 
Reincarnation of the Arab Cold War…often called the Iran-Saudi proxy war, it is 
a sectarian confrontation…today, the second Arab Cold War has a different tinge. 
The Saudi-led moderates have changed little; the radicals however are now no 
longer secular, but Islamist and primarily Shia, led by Iran’s anti-Western, anti-
Israeli ideology.16 
 
In his article titled, “Iran and Saudi Arabia Square Off: The Growing Rivalry 
between Tehran and Riyadh” Dr. Mohsen Milani, warns that the cold war will strengthen 
anti-democratic forces in the region. He further elaborates by stating that,  
The two countries, at odds since the 1979 revolution in Iran and ever more so in 
the wake of the Arab Spring, are competing for dominance in global energy 
markets and nuclear technology and for political influence in the Persian Gulf and 
the Levant. Their conflict, with its sectarian overtones, has the potential to 
weaken pro-democracy forces in the Middle East and North Africa, empower 
Islamists, and drag the United States into military interventions.17 
 
As evidenced, many renowned Middle East experts have described the current 
rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran as a cold war with many vast and wide 
implications for the Middle East and the United States. It is therefore crucial to address 
how accurate a description this cold war framework is when analyzing the Saudi Arabian 
and Iranian relationship.  
                                                
15 Zack Beauchamp, “Iran and Saudi Arabia's Cold War Is Making the Middle East Even More 
Dangerous,” VOX, March 30, 2015, accessed April 11, 2015, http://www.vox.com/2015/3/ 
30/8314513/saudi-arabia-iran. 
 
16 Roxane Farmanfarmaian, “Redrawing the Middle East Map: Iran, Syria and the New Cold War,” Al 
Jazeera, November 15 2012, accessed June 18, 
2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/11/2012111311424048459.html. 
 
17 Ibid 
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During the Cold War that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
the world experienced the effects of two superpowers whose ambitions for hegemony 
intensified all global political concerns and marked a time when both nations increased 
their arms and search for resources in order to support their missions of sustained 
interventions in regional politics. Cold wars between two rival nations include a 
dominating rivalry within their ranks, resulting in the inevitable causatum that the rivals 
will forcefully project their own conflicts into the periphery.18 While during the Cold 
War, entire regions were impacted by the global conflict between the two rival super 
powers, regional cold wars are also significant as local rivalries and antagonisms in the 
Middle East and North African region will more likely be capitalized and will retain very 
little autonomy regarding resolution. Thus, if the growing rivalry between Saudi Arabia 
and Iran marks a cold war in the Middle East, it can only be assumed that Saudi Arabia 
and Iran’s continued capitalization of weakened political institutions will have similar 
significant effects on security, stability and economic growth in the Gulf and wider 
Middle East and will lead to protracted conflicts that will last for decades. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the 21st Century,” International Affairs Vol. 67, No. 3 
(1991) 
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Cold War Dimensions: 
Based on this analysis of Cold War literature, in order to highlight the current 
realities of the Middle East, it is possible to identify seven dimensions that will be 
important to consider in our analysis of the degree to which the application of the “Cold 
War” framework fits the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These themes will 
be further elaborated upon in the succeeding chapters.  
The first dimension is ideology for a major issue of contention between the Soviet 
Union and the United States was their competing worldviews, fostered by domestic 
values. While the Soviet Union had a revolutionary ideology to create a Communist 
utopia, the United States envisioned a free, unified international system upholding values 
of democracy and free trade. These ideological differences came to dominate Soviet-US 
relations, fueling the enduring and contentious Cold War. The second dimension that has 
been identified as central to the Cold War is diplomacy. When World War II ended so 
did the alliance between the Soviet Union and United States. As their political, economic 
and social rivalry increased, a period of tense and hostile relations dominated their 
relations. With only brief periods of détente, Soviet Union and United States’ suspicions 
towards the other made negotiations and treaties virtually non-existent.19 The third 
dimension identified is the role of alliances. Alliances played a major role during the 
Cold War as the ideological contest between the capitalist West and communist East was 
                                                
19 "Truman Library: Ideological Foundations of the Cold War Online Research File." Truman Library: 
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exported all throughout the world, pitting Western alliances against Eastern alliances. 
Those in the West generally represent popularly elected, multiparty governments that 
supported individual freedoms and private enterprise. Those allied with the East generally 
supported a way of life with central government regulation, no private property, and on 
the collaborative collective.20 The fourth dimension is economic. The defense budget of 
both countries increased substantially. As much of the national budget went to the 
advancing technology, defense, and weaponry, it often took away from social welfare 
programs, education, healthcare and housing. Economic inflation and stagnation became 
serious consequences of the cold war. Additionally, economic spending generally went to 
the funding and exportation of the East vs. West ideology globally, as the Soviet Union 
and United States pressed to fill the void left by power vacuums that resulted from World 
War II. Another dimension that is important to note as central to the Cold War was the 
arms race. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and United States were engaged in a 
competition to have the best armed forces, including greater armies, superior military 
technology, larger numbers of weapons, etc. Especially unique to the Cold War was the 
nuclear issue, in which the superpowers competed in supremacy in nuclear warfare, 
developing tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. The sixth important dimension to 
consider is proxy conflicts. Proxy wars are fought as a way for the rival powers to 
retain— or expand— their control in a given region. The Cold War witnessed a world in 
which satellites or surrogates of the United States and Soviet Union fought dozens of 
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“proxy wars”. These proxy wars constantly shifted the balance of power between these 
two superpowers. They also caused protracted wars that ended in deaths of millions of 
individuals caught in the crossfire. These proxy wars are dangerous, as they tend to 
inflame conflicts for elongated time periods, disrupt regional stability and heighten 
mutual fears. Lastly, the seventh dimension identified is the United States and Soviet 
Union’s involvement in wars. While proxy wars provide these superpowers with the 
ability to indirectly try to achieve their aims during conflict, there are also cases where 
one or both powers directly intervene in accordance with its interests.21 The Korean War, 
the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan are all prime examples of this phenomenon. 
 
Identity and Foreign Policy 
Although identifying these dimensions is essential in order to apply the 
framework of a cold war to the growing Saudi-Iranian rivalry, when considering the 
political history and current foreign policy trends of the Middle East, it is important to 
also incorporate the concept of state identity and its role.22 Saudi Arabia and Iran’s 
rivalry has often been cited to result from differences including:“Sectarianism, 
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nationalism, revolutionary ideology, competition over regional hegemony, oil prices, 
policy towards U.S. military presence in the Gulf, and disagreements over the hajj.”23 
 
While these differences are fundamental in explaining the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, there are 
also defining moments of rapprochement that existed between these two states. In order 
to fully understand the cessation and resurgence of rivalry and cold war status, it is 
important to take into account identity politics. Identity politics, here, refers to 
movements that mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity in order to claim state 
power.24 Focusing on ideational and material factors demonstrates how “changes in state 
identity - particularly in the official foreign policy discourse - indicated changes in 
policy, and therefore a shift in the amity-enmity pattern between the two states.”25 
Constructivists who looked towards developing theories of identity and politics in the 
Middle East have found that a shared identity can be linked to either constructive or 
destructive forms of nationalism and also encourages periods of conflict or cooperation.26  
Professor David Little, rationalizes that the identity of a nation is formed by ethnic and 
religious impulses, and that these impulses directly correlate to nationalistic conflict. For, 
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 Although ethnic groups or peoples do not necessarily need a religious reason to 
seek to preserve and promote their identity by achieving political sovereignty, a 
claim of religious legitimacy is likely to strengthen and intensify such a 
campaign.27 
 
This is important to note for the state is an administering institution that is defined by 
three major structural components: 1) Ideational component, the purpose of which 
includes basic governing functions of providing civil order, protection from internal and 
external threats, and providing resources/collective goods; 2) Institutional component, 
which includes the executive, legislative and judicial bodies that compromise the 
governing system and provide basic laws, procedures and norms; 3) Physical component, 
the population which acts as the potential resource pool that a territory can mobilize 
through economic development and contributes to the state by providing man-made 
capital. This physical component also includes the territory of a state and all natural 
resources.28  
Collective identities provide individuals with the information that they need in 
order to form opinions about themselves and the other. Furthermore, identities are formed 
in relation to and out of interaction with the other. Identification runs on a continuum of 
negative and positive and when viewing the other, conception can be related to the other 
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as a perversion of or as an inclusion to their self.29  Identities also provide a framework 
for guiding action. When considering collective identity, the state (the administering 
institution) claims supreme authority in both political allegiance, its state identity, and 
also over instruments of power and force. State identity affects the foreign policy that a 
state will be pursue and in return, foreign policy may influence state identity. Thus, the 
political elites that make up the state can manipulate the politics of identity to justify 
war.30 
In line with this theory of identity being used to encourage conflict and violence, 
Johann Galtung, the famous Norwegian sociologist and peace researcher, posits that 
violence is a result of three interacting forces: structural, cultural, and physical. Structural 
violence provides the foundation of an unjust system as it institutionalizes unequal 
opportunities for education, resources, and the goods essential to meet one’s basic human 
needs. Structural violence is built into the social, political and economic fabric of society, 
and privileges some classes, ethnicities, and nationalities over another. Cultural violence 
refers to the prevailing attitudes and beliefs that have been taught to us from birth, 
shaping assumptions about “us” and the world. Cultural violence is important to 
understand as it legitimizes structural violence by justifying notions of inferiority or 
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superiority regarding race, religion, nationality(etc). Together, cultural violence and 
structural violence causes physical violence, which can take on many forms such as war, 
killing, torture, physical force against material infrastructure, rape and more.31 Physical 
violence further reinforces cultural and structural violence.32 Thus, the role of social 
norms, beliefs and behaviors can powerfully influence and mobilize ethnic conflict.   
 Additional factors that are critical in understanding the fragmentation of armed 
violence and its linkages to political mobilization are: 1) State weakness, in regards to 
lack of legitimacy and government functionality; as well as 2) external involvement, ie 
influence via political and economic means or actual military intervention and/or 
occupation.  For instance, external forces might intervene because a state has failed or a 
state might fail because a foreign partner intervened and a new functional and legitimate 
state was unable to replace it.33 In regards to this concept of legitimacy, theorists have 
explained that weak states usually create societies with scarce opportunities, wealth and 
resources. Not only do these elements fuel violence but they also encourage “legitimacy 
bids” by political leaders and elites in an attempt to sway the general public. Political 
legitimacy is important for political leaders, for the hearts and minds of the people must 
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be satisfied with the government in order for it to effectively implement policy.34 In 
democratic governments, the consent of the governed is derived by a government’s 
ability to 1) be transparent, 2) guarantee fundamental rights and 3) prioritize freedoms 
and liberties. Authoritarian governments, however, do not derive their “right to rule” via 
these means and must therefore base their governing system on a different form of 
legitimacy; ethnic and/or religious nationalism. Religious or ethnic nationalism is where 
political leaders make appeals to individuals within a community based on a common 
culture, language, or shared history and is employed to directly include or exclude 
members from this national core identity. Essentially, “legitimacy bids” allow political 
leaders to favor one religious or ethnic group in lieu of another.35 Professor Little 
contends that the potential for violence increases when weak states utilize national 
intolerance. In fact, he applies this to authoritarian states as well, “authoritarian states 
appear to draw life from ethnic or religious intolerance as a way of justifying the degree 
of violence required to maintain power.”36 
For weak or authoritarian states, uncovering the roots of violent ethnic or 
sectarian conflict is a major concern as it is the key to maintaining political stability and 
security. Throughout the lands of Islam, religion remains a major component of an 
individual’s identity. During the post-World War Two era, much of the Muslim world 
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regained autonomy. The newly emergent nations, such as Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan 
and Syria were created by European colonial states with artificial or arbitrarily drawn 
boundaries that shared few similarities with the Ottoman boundaries that once existed. As 
such, when political leaders attempted to build the new nation, they ran into the issues of 
political legitimacy and national identity.37 Ethnic and political mobilization are 
fundamental factors in attempting to explain the rise of sectarianism through the Middle 
East. As Dr. Nader Hashemi has explained, “most mainstream forms of political Islam 
are religious forms of nationalism whose actors have accepted the borders of the 
postcolonial countries and are fundamentally concerned with the internal national politics 
of their home countries. 38  
Identity politics in the Middle East differs from most other regions as the schism 
that exists between the Sunnis and Shi’ites is an issue that encompasses transnational 
legitimacy contestations and identity-based claims that provide an important perspective 
of both inter-Arab dynamics and Arab-Persian dynamics.39 State identities, “are tied to 
residents’ relationships to those outside the boundaries of the community and territory, 
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respectively.” Identity is a significant source of the state’s national interests. Thus, being 
attentive to how deeply the Islamic identity is important in the shifting of practices and 
meanings attached to that identity. National identities, especially in the Middle East, are 
fluid and constantly changing, identities are not mutually exclusive.40 Essentially, the 
Saudi-Iranian structural tensions represent two opposing aspirations for Islamic 
leadership with two vastly different political systems. Conventional foreign policy 
explanations without this understanding of identity politics,   
Cannot account for the temporal aspects of the state, especially the identity that 
the state chooses for itself… [Moreover], identities change over time as the as the 
international or regional environment forces them to compete, cooperate, or 
oppose each other. In this sense, foreign policy can be seen as a symbolic 
battlefield for identity conflicts.41  
 
Understanding identity in the role of state rivalry in the Middle East is essential as 
it reveals insight as to why the current environment of continuous violence and chaos 
exists and why Saudi-Iranian relations transform from enmity to friendly and back to 
enmity at different historical and modern intervals.  Defining moments, such as the 
Iranian Revolution, the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and the 2011 Arab Uprisings have 
changed the state identity of Saudi Arabia and Iran, thereby altering the perception of 
each state towards the other. 
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Conclusion 
Thus, as the evolution of geopolitics is ongoing, foreign policy theories on evolutionary 
interstate rivalries in world politics are important to comprehend. In the analysis of the 
traditional Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, this section 
explained that rivalry that existed between these two Superpowers could not be classified 
as a mere interstate war. In their struggle for supremacy, the Soviet Union and the United 
States became engaged in a zero-sum game contesting for land, resources, weapons and 
influence. The political, social end economic tensions eventually created a global 
political environment that culminated in a series of wars fought in almost every corner of 
the world. Thus, as their rivalry included overlapping elements of interstate, extra state 
and intrastate wars, this thesis has provided an alternate way to define warfare by adding 
a fourth dimension, cold war. 
  Many Middle East experts have begun identifying the rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran as a New Middle East cold war. As such, this thesis will research to what 
degree the seven “cold war” characteristics identified in the analysis of Cold War 
literature can be applied to the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Additionally, 
identity politics in the region differs from most other regions. Therefore, in order to fully 
consider the political history and current foreign policy trends of the Middle East, this 
study will also incorporate state identity and its role. 
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Chapter Three: The Origins of Saudi-Iranian Relations 1924-1979 
An understanding of long-term historical trends is necessary to comprehend the 
development of the Middle East cold war. History is dynamic. It is a process that is 
constantly evolving and it reveals a story of seemingly unconnected events that are in fact 
crucial to understanding the variety of perspectives and beliefs defended by the nations, 
tribes and ethnicities formed by these historical narratives. The culture of the Middle East 
is deeply imbedded in its history. The region looks towards the past in order to define and 
explain present situations and is used as a guide for future developments. Thus, the 
history of the land is transparent in the identity of its people. By examining the span of 
the modern history of the Middle East, it is evident that individual events, domestic and 
foreign policies, and significant moments have built upon one another to shape the 
current tensions and will continue to shape the future in a notable manner. Looking at the 
early relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will explain how these countries have been 
“conditioned” to act and react in a certain manner.42 While attempts to analyze the 
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modern history of the Middle East may be rendered insignificant due to new and 
unexpected happenings in the current politics of the region, it is still important to identify 
trends and developments that were important events of the time and identify those 
moments that have the potential to act as defining situations in the years to come.  
The early years of Saudi-Iranian relations provide important insight to the roots 
and causes of the recurring rivalry between the two states This section will explore how 
Saudi Arabia and Iran have consolidated and pursued state power and authority. 
Additionally, by comparing and contrasting Saudi Arabia and Iran’s state building during 
these formative years, this section serves to provide a brief background surrounding the 
phases where a clear alignment and mutual understanding existed. This section will also 
highlight the significant events that kept both states highly guarded and cautious towards 
the other.  
Origins of the Schism: “Two Branches of the Same Tree”43:  
To understand just how the conflict behavior of and between these two adverse 
countries is influenced, it is useful to analyze the rivalry within its historical context.44 
There are many who view the divide as an intractable conflict characterized by a deep 
schism and age-old enmity that exists between the Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims that can be 
traced back to the origins of the religion itself. After all, the leading players are the two 
states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, who have consciously and adamantly proclaimed 
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themselves and their polities to be the “true Islamic state.” Both Iran and Saudi Arabia 
contend that their societies and polities are based on true Islamic normative values and 
that their regimes govern their people on the basis of divine law and Sharia, a legal code 
derived from the Quran and supplemented by the traditions of Muhammad and the early 
generations of Muslims. In regards to this point, a further examination of the relationship 
between Islam and politics must take place. For even on a rudimentary level, it can be 
understood that both Iran and Saudi Arabia have two very different and vast 
interpretations of the forms and rules of governance. In order to understand the current 
political environment, it is important to first concentrate on the fissure that exists between 
the Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. 
The Sunni-Shi’ite conflict is a political and religious divide whose origins date 
back to the death of Muhammad in 632 CE and the subsequent debate of who is the 
rightful heir to Islam. Of the 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, about 1.3 billion are Sunni 
and roughly 200 million are Shi’ite, while the remainder identify with other 
denominations of Islam. Around the rim of the Persian Gulf, coveted for both its 
economic and geostrategic glory, it is actually Shi’ites who constitute the majority of the 
population.45 As scholars explain, this divide is a conflict of identity that is deeply felt by 
Muslims. And yet, Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims have lived peacefully together for 
centuries. In his book, Ideals and Realities of Islam, Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
portrays Islam as a religion that encompasses various ethnic and racial groups. Islam is 
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not monolithic and from the very beginning of Islam, there had already existed two 
different perspectives: Sunnism and Shi’ism. He makes a distinction here, as he compels 
his reader to look past the idea that Sunnism and Shi’ism are two sects of a religion and 
towards the more advanced theory that they are both “orthodox” interpretations of 
Islamic revelation.46 Unlike the two other Abrahamic religions of Judaism and 
Christianity, Professor Nasr observes that Sunnism and Shi’ism were not the result of a 
defection within the religion that led to the reformation and creation of religious factions. 
Shi’ism and Sunnism are rather two integral parts that constitute the unity of the Islamic 
tradition.   
Important Divergences 
There are, however, important differences within the two orthodoxies that have 
led various Middle East scholars to conclude that the Sunni-Shi’ite divide is an 
intractable conflict characterized by a deep schism and age-old enmity that can be traced 
back to the origins of the religion itself. The first concerns political rule. With the death 
of the prophet Muhammad, a difference of opinion materialized regarding the rightful 
successor to the Prophet as leader of the Islamic community. Those who believed that 
leadership should stay within the family backed Ali and became known as the Shi’ites.47 
The majority of the community believed that Abu Bakr should be Muhammad’s 
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successor and, as no instruction was left behind regarding this matter, leadership should 
be based on the consensus of opinion. This majority group is more widely known as the 
Sunnis.48 Regarding political leadership, the Sunnis and Shi’ites also diverge on ideas 
regarding the political authority of the leader. Where the Sunni ulama supports the status 
quo and the existing political institutions as a ruler, the Shi’ites believe that the successor 
should also be the interpreter of religion and the guardian of his esoteric knowledge as 
any rightful successor will also posses the Prophet’s powers.49  
Another main distinction that exists concerns the role of intermediaries in Islam. 
Traditionally, Sunnis believed in the Prophet and in saints as intermediaries between God 
and man. Today’s more puritanical Sunnis, however, believe that God is transcendent. As 
such, any intermediaries between God and man should not exist. As Shi’ites believe that 
political leadership acts as a trustee of sorts, intermediaries are roles filled together by 
both the Prophet and the Imams. Further differences exist between Sunnism and Shi’ism 
regarding interpretation of Islamic law and regarding aspects of faith and ritual. While 
there are distinguishing features that separate Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims, they ultimately 
share a faith and are united in the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and in the word of 
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the Qur’an.50 Sunni and Shi’ite Islam share ideologies in the fundamentals of the religion; 
in its doctrines of unity, prophecy, the belief that God is just, and eschatology (pertaining 
to the end of history such as death, judgment, etc). As such, “Sunnism and Shi’ism are 
dimensions within Islam placed there not to destroy its unity but to enable a larger 
humanity and differing spiritual types to participate in it.” 51 
Islamic Interpretation and Adaptations in the Modern Middle East 
Ultimately, the Sunni-Shi’ite divide is not a simple religious dispute that dates 
back to Islam's origins. What separates these two orthodox dimensions of Islam is the 
creation of an identity that has been forged by 1400 years of different political, cultural, 
technological and social history.52 Theology and history are but two dimensions, that 
when combined with today’s concerns, grievances, regional conflicts and foreign 
interventions, have created a sectarian conflict that is both old and modern.53 Dr. Vali 
Nasr, explains that sectarian conflict is a, 
Thread that has long run through the fabric of social and political life across the 
broader Middle East-at times invisible within a regional politics that can be more 
intricate and colorful than the latter on an Isfahan carpet, but at other times as 
obvious as the stripe running down the middle of a highway.54 
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 In the Middle East, religion and identity are interwoven. This merging of identities can 
lead to periods of coexistence. The Sunnis and Shi’ites main provinces overlap 
geographically, and from North Africa to Southeast Asia, Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims 
have shared struggles against common enemies, engage in friendships, pray together at he 
same mosques, and even intermarry.55 And yet, the sectarian struggle is one that remains 
lurking just beneath the surface.  
As the Muslim Empire continued to expand, “denominations” in the sense of 
divisions, sects, and schools of thoughts over various issues emerged within the Shi’ite 
and Sunni branches of the Islamic community.56 Within the political realm of the Shi’ite 
ulama, opinions are divided among those who endorse politically activist interpretations 
of religious doctrines to those who endorse more politically quietest interpretations. 57 
Within the Sunni Muslim community, an even larger multitude of religious voices 
developed, as varying interpretations and compromises were instituted in order to 
contend within the specific contexts of institutions, and at the same time, uphold the 
integrity and unity of the Sunni community.  
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From the eighteenth century to present day, the Islamic world “witnessed a 
protracted period of upheaval and renewal.”58 In response to the political challenge of 
Western intellectual and political change, movements of reform and national 
independence developed. Muslims, struggling to comprehend the failures of society, the 
impact of European colonialism, and the superpower rivalry between the United States 
and the Soviet Union following World War Two, retriggered the vital question of the true 
authority of Islam. In the face of the jarring and tumultuous European colonialism, the 
ulama was viewed as largely discredited and revivalist movements spread across much of 
the Muslim world, such as Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia. Many of these movements sought 
to restore the practice of the “Golden Age,” creating communities of believers committed 
to the creation of such revisionist Islamic societies. These movements determinedly 
became political movements that established Islamic states, the same states that would 
become the forerunners of the modern states that delineate the post World War II Middle 
East and North African region. 
Faced with this challenge of modernity and Western domination, a further divide 
occurred within the region, with political movements using Islam to further their 
objectives of reserving Western hegemony. Some movements responded by supporting a 
fusion of Islamic heritage and modernity. To restore and rejuvenate the Islamic spirit, 
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they advocated that Islam is compatible with the West’s interpretation of reason, science 
and technology. They emphasized the need to reform religious, legal and social aspects of 
society in order to revitalize the Muslim community and to face and reinterpret Islam in 
light of this new force. Other Muslim reformers insisted that Islam is the alternative way 
of life as it is self-sufficient, comprehensive and holistic. They claimed that  the political 
subjugation of Muslims to foreign authorities was the immediate and direct result of 
Muslims failing to adhere to their own authoritative religious norms. These reformers 
strived to revivify Islam’s Golden Age and they proclaimed that the only and best way 
for Muslims to change their circumstances was to renew their Islamic piety and 
adherence to God’s command. Islamic governance was thus the only solution and this 
governance would be created. 
Union of Saudi Power and Wahhabi Teaching: 
 In 1924, Abdul Aziz al-Saud captured Mecca, the holiest place in Islam and by 
1932, he united the two kingdoms of the Hejaz and Nejd, thereby establishing the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The nation integrated the beliefs, norms and values of the 
indigenous populous into a national identity with a sense of a shared moral purpose and 
mutual trust.   
Wahhabis claim to be the “true Sunnis,” and, in principle, Wahhabism is both a 
religious and political movement. Wahhabism is the eighteenth-century reformist 
movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society. Named after its founder, ibn Abd al-
Wahab, Wahabbism is a movement that strives to purify Islam by returning Muslims to 
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the “original principles” of Islam. In doing so Wahhabism rejects Bid’ah, religious 
innovations, and shirk, polytheism,. It began in response to the perceived moral decline 
and political weakness of the Muslim community in Arabia. Wahhabism denounces the 
practices of shrine cults, saint worship, and requests for intercessions from anyone other 
than God, and assigning authority to anyone other than God as heretical. This included 
the worship of saints, pilgrimages to their mausoleums, use of alcohol, chapels, tobacco, 
music, etc.59 Abd al-Wahhab, in the early eighteenth century, proposed to return to 
original Islam in order to restore Islam’s Golden Age at the time of the Prophet and his 
companions. Abd al-Wahhab situated that in order to retrieve a puritanical Islam, the 
“infidel” customs would need to be replaced by the full and uncompromising 
implementation of Sharia. 60 He projected that in order to return to original Islam, 
violence and political power would be necessary to achieve these goals, and instated a 
fatwa of Jihad. The Wahhabists described themselves as muwahhidun, Unitarians.61 
Although Wahhabism represents a divergence from the more traditional branches of 
Sunni Islam, it propagates great significance to the fact that its polities are Islamic. In 
fact, Saudi Arabia has based its entire governing system on the legitimacy of its religious 
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creed. The marriage of Saudi power and Wahhabi teaching began when Abd al-Wahhab 
found refuge under the protection of Ibn Saud and his tribe in 1744. Viewed as a radical, 
al-Wahhab was forced to leave his hometown. When al-Wahhab found refuge with Ibn 
al-Saud, a local chieftain from Najd, al-Saud saw Wahhab’s teachings as a “means to 
overturn Arab tradition and convention…a path of seizing power.”62 Together, they 
formed an alliance that allowed al-Saud control over military, political and economic 
matters and established al-Wahhab as the sole religious figure in charge of religious 
creed. This alliance resulted in the first Saudi dynasty and remains the basis for Saudi 
Arabia’s monarchical rule. This first dynasty was short lived. It is significant, however, 
as it combined the warriors of Ibn Saud with the reformist message of al-Wahhab into a 
politico-religious force that expanded throughout northern Arabia and succeeded in 
capturing Mecca in 1803. The merger was broken up when the Ottoman Empire felt 
threatened by the movement and sent Muhammad Ali and Egyptian troops to destroy the 
movement.63 
As Shi’ism grew more popular in Persia and Iraq and the Ottoman Empire began 
showing the first signs of decline, Wahhabis’ assumed the objective to build another 
Sunni state that would extend not only to the Najd, but also to all Arab countries in order 
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to restore Islam to its original purity.64  Beginning in the late eighteenth century and 
continuing through the interwar years (WWI, WWII), the second Saudi-Wahhabi emirate 
emerged. The political revival of Wahhabism began in 1902 when Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud 
(grandson of the original Ibn Saud) emerged from his exile and seized the city of Riyadh. 
What was truly unique about this political revival was that the twentieth century 
witnessed the “emergence of a state imposed on people without a historical memory or 
unity or national heritage which would justify their inclusion into a single entity.”65 The 
significance of this was monumental. Ibn Saud was able to use Islam to unify the 
politically divided rival tribes and peoples under a single consolidated authority. He 
combined his secular position as a victorious tribal leader with his religious status as the 
head of the Wahhabi order.66 During the conquest, the Ikwahn Warriors destroyed 
venerated domed tombs and Shi’ite religious sites. 
 Ibn Saud understood the culture and traditions of the region and recognized that 
although tradition demanded that the newly integrated tribes be loyal to him due to his 
military prowess, their loyalties could be just as easily withdrawn. Thus, he created a 
reason for the people to be committed to him in a higher form of loyalty, and this was via 
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the use of the puritanical Wahhabi doctrine.67 Ibn Saud built mosques for the 
communities and sent the ulama into them to disseminate the Wahhabi code. He also 
provided the communities with material assistance via the supply of agricultural 
equipment and arms. Ibn Saud provided the tribes with a desire and sense of mission, for 
their commitment to Ibn Saud became enshrined and bound to their commitment to the 
expansion of their belief and faith. 
 It is evident that for Saud to achieve his goal of creating a state based on his name, 
his success was contingent on the unequivocal and full support of the Wahhabi religious 
establishment.68 As the partnership between the Wahhabi religious establishment and the 
House of Saud grew, the ulama began to indiscriminately issue religious justification to 
Saudi rule via use of religious statutes. This set the ultimate precedent that the Saud 
family and those related to them via marriage had a monopoly of religious and political 
power. Saudi Arabia's role as the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” continues to 
make it vital for Saudi Arabia’s religious rhetoric to be deemed victorious in the battle of 
ideology and belief in the Muslim world.  
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The Shah of Iran 
 By the 1500s the Safavids had regained control of Persian lands from the 
Mongols and adopted Shi’ism as the state religion.69 From the beginning, Persians were 
vastly responsive to the Shi’ite cause and its long congruent history has led scholars to 
conclude that Shi’ite Islam has “an intimate connection with the Persian soul.”70 
Furthermore, the Safavids were eager to advance Shi’ism by military means in order to 
build a state that was separate from the Ottomans. Iranians form the largest population of 
Shi’ites in the world.  
In the 1920s, a solider by the name of Reza Khan rose to power. In 1925, He 
declared a coup d’etat with the support of the British and overthrew the Qajar dynasty. 
Reza Shah’s mission was to reassert Iran’s role in the Gulf.71 Reza Khan took an opposite 
approach to Ibn al Saud in consolidating state power. Inspired by Kemal Ataturk’s 
westernization of Turkey, he undertook a radical transformation of Iran. He believed that 
religious traditions kept Iran backward and vulnerable to foreign occupation and rule and 
thus challenged the Shi’ite religious establishment, established a large central 
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government and rebuilt the Iranian army.72 Reza Shah saw Saudi Arabia both as a 
regional competition on the regional level and also as a threat to his developments in the 
Gulf.73 Iran had many historical claims to land that were located on the Arabian side of 
the Gulf. The Shah saw that Saudi Arabia was making major advances and thus, wanted 
to not only engage with Saudi Arabia as a contending power, but also to monitor it 
closely, worried that the resurgence of Wahabbism would have lasting implications on 
the practice of other forms of Islam. The first main outreach occurred in 1927 when the 
Shah sent delegations to express willingness to establish diplomatic relations.  
Relations and Early Tensions 
Between 1925 and 1930, the two monarchs competed locally and regionally to 
assert hegemony. One of the first instances that caused major tension between these two 
modern Middle East states occurred during these formative years. On April 20th, 1925 the 
Shah annexed Khuzistan to Persia, greatly alarming King Abdul Aziz. As a contrast, 
Saudi Arabia signed a bilateral treaty with the British in 1927, to establish additional 
buffer governments in the Gulf, recognizing the governments of Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Oman. Reza Shah deemed this as a direct challenge to Iran’s sovereignty as he believed 
these treaties to undermine Iranian claims to the Gulf, specifically over Bahrain.74 The 
Shah sent over a Memorandum of Objection, demanding the return of Bahrain to Iranian 
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soil and even launched a formal complaint with the League of Nations. Despite territorial 
agreements, mainly regarding claims of sovereignty to the two islands of Farsi and al-
Arabi in the Persian Gulf, the Saudis concluded a Friendship Agreement. Originally 
declared in 1929, this treaty set out the basic principles for establishing political, 
diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries.  This treaty held 
relatively stable until 1943. By this time, Reza Khan was ousted and replaced by his son, 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The new Shah did maintain normal relations with the Saudis 
until the Saudi Kingdom arrested and executed a Shi’ite Pilgrim that was accused of 
defaming the holy shrine in Mecca, the Ka’ba. Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relations were 
resumed for a short while in 1947. By 1950, Iran was experiencing major issues with its 
domestic politics, mainly dealing with Iranian oil nationalization and the majlis 
committees rejection of the poor profit-sharing provision offered by the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company (AIOC). 75 By 1950, Saudi-Iranian Bilateral relations catapulted towards 
complete derailment. 1955 further strained already poor relations as Iran joined the US-
proposed Baghdad Pact and later Turkish-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Cooperation after the 
United States helped the Shah regain power and oust Mossadegh. Saudi Arabia was very 
threated by this Pact as it undermined their key position and role in the region, threatened 
to further divide the region between pro-Western and anti-Western sides, and also 
included Jordan and Iraq, Hashemite Kingdoms that had lasting feuds with the Kingdom. 
While the two nations attempted to solidify their relations following the Iranian decision 
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to join the Baghdad Pact, King Saud was deeply upset by the Iranian’s refusal to consider 
Saudi reservations. King Saud lashed out, ordering Saudi authorities to deny access to 
any Bahrainis that they suspected to be of Persian origins. On his side, the Shah of Iran 
criticized Saudi Arabia in various media outlets. The seriousness with which Iran viewed 
its claim to Bahrain was re-manifested when the Shah cancelled his state visit to the 
monarchy of Saudi Arabia in 1968. By this point, Saudi Arabia and Iran had re-
normalized their relations and found themselves unified against developments in the 
region. And yet, just mere days before the Shahs visit to Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia had 
announced full support of Bahrain and even inferred the impending construction of a 12-
mile bridge to link Bahrain to Saudi Arabia. This conflict over Bahrain remained a major 
source of contention between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
Despite previous antagonism, bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi resumed 
stronger than ever when both countries realized the significant implications associated 
with imminent British withdrawal and that it was a major strategic problem that 
concerned the whole Persian Gulf. Iran understood that accommodating with the largest 
Arab state in the Persian Gulf was essential to preserving Iran’s greater interests. This 
important event paved the way for closer cooperation between the two nations. 76 Upon 
the accession of King Faisal to the Saudi throne in 1964, this new phase began. The first 
significant step was that Saudi Arabia and Iran resolved their contentious standing over 
the continental shelf in the Persian Gulf. After years of negotiation, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
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signed an agreement in 1965 that resolved the question of the median line but also 
stipulated sovereignty regarding the islands of Farsi and al Arabia, with each country 
sharing, in effect, the enormous seabed of oil resource in the Persian Gulf. From the 
British departure in December 1971 until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Saudi-Iranian 
relations increased to an all time high, with the relations improving their mutual relations 
and interests. Both countries became more active regionally under the “Twin Pillar” 
strategy initiated by the Nixon Doctrine, which was aimed at supporting conservative, 
pro-Western policy. Economic, diplomatic and military support was brought to both 
countries in exchange for protecting the law and order of the region.77  The Nixon 
doctrine effectively armed and subsidized these two regional “policemen” of the gulf. 
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran were utterly committed to maintaining the status quo in the 
region, supporting states such as North Yemen, Somalia and Oman, destabilizing those 
radical states such as South Yemen, and cooperated in a coordinated policy to diminish 
the power of the Ba’athist regime, where they supported Kuwait against Iraq’s attempts 
to gain concessions to its ports. They also supported each other in their attempts to 
subvert the Iraqi government. At this point in their friendly relations, the Shah reflected,  
I had traveled on several occasions to Saudi Arabia, a country whose integrity and 
independence are sacred for all Muslims. As a faithful Muslim and Defender of 
the Faith, I hope that Saudi Arabia will always remain the guardian of these holy 
places, Mecca and Medina.78 
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Conclusion 
In looking at the modern history of Saudi-Iranian relations, it is clear that while 
this early period marked a time when significant tensions existed between these two 
states, it also corresponds to a time when they engaged in collaborative and even friendly 
relations. While an overview of the cold war dimensions outlined in chapter two reveals 
that the consolidation and formation of these two states set the stage for their upcoming 
feud, it is evident that the period from 1924-1979 (pre-1979 Revolution) did not feature a 
cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
 Saudi Arabia and Iran differ in many aspects. State consolidation and the 
formation of both countries overlapped greatly with both religious and ethnic collective 
narratives, forming both its political systems and state narrative. Iran, for many centuries, 
has maintained itself as the protector of Shi’ite Islam. Iran has many ethnic groups and 
several autonomous movements. Its Shi’ite heritage, however, has been a significant 
unifying factor that has allowed it to withstand ethnic division.79 The very foundation of 
this social bond stands in juxtaposition to Saudi Arabia’s inherent religious nationalism. 
Moreover, these two states share a history that extends beyond the modern nation-state 
system, a history of animosity and ethnocentrism, of looking down upon one another. 
Since the origin of the schism following the death of Muhammad, Sunnis and Shi’ites 
have held competing Islamic ideologies. From the battle of Karbala to the battle of 
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Chaldiran in the early sixteenth century and the dominance of Sunni Islam via the power 
of the Ottoman Empire, Shi’ite Muslims have developed the religious and political 
conscience of a persecuted minority. This Sunni dominance was further integrated into 
the creation of the modern-state of Saudi Arabia.  
As the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia upholds the status of protector of Mecca and 
Medina, Islam’s most holy cities. From the partnership of Muhammad ibn Abd al 
Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud, Saudi Arabia’s ruling family created a state executive 
order that granted them the authority to protect the religious beliefs of the community, 
without question. The advent of Wahhabism in the nineteenth century was designed as a 
puritanical form of Islam that defined itself in opposition to the “heretical” beliefs and 
values of the Shi’ite Muslims. Seizing on Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine, Ibn Saud’s clan 
reintroduced the idea of martyrdom under the banner of jihad, targeting both non- 
Muslims and denouncing those Muslims who have gone astray, ahl al-dhalal. They used 
this auspice of Jihad to justify raiding neighboring villages and robbing them of their 
possessions.  
As the origins of the Saudi-Iranian modern state maintained strong ties to these early 
Sunni-Shi’ite religious and political antagonisms, the relations were characterized by 
major suspicions regarding the other. As is evident, Saudi-Iranian relations, even from 
these early years, played a highly important role in the political and ideological history of 
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the modern Middle East.80 And yet, these differences did not deter them from building a 
strong relationship. While differences resulting from faith and nationality did arise, both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran were wiling to dismiss these differences in order to pursue their 
mutual national security interests. This was especially true in the foundational years of 
the 1950’s through the 1970’s, specifically the withdrawal of the British from the Gulf 
and how Saudi Arabia and Iran collaborated via diplomatic means to focus on these 
mutual interests.  
What is most important to consider is that the Shah’s vision of Iran’s state identity to 
be modern, secular and even Westernized did not threaten Saudi interests. In Saudi 
Arabia, while its formation was imbedded in Wahhabi thinking, it wasn’t until the reign 
of King Faysal in the mid 1960’s that a centralized state was consolidated. In the 1970’s, 
as Saudi Arabia’s wealth increased due to oil profits, King Faysal began to change the 
political system by centralizing the decision making process and by eliminating rival 
contestants. In addition, Saudi Arabia began to sincerely advocate and promote the 
country as the Islamic state with a mission to spread Islam and piety globally and to 
ultimately develop institutions that would embody this pursuit.81   
The political leadership of both states garnered foreign policies that were oriented at 
protecting the status quo of the region and joined forces to fight communism and 
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nationalist forces, whether they be Pan-Arabism, Nasserism or Ba’athism. Therefore, 
prior to the fall of the Shah in 1979, Saudi Arabia and Iran cultivated state identities that 
were in alignment with the other. As such, numerous opportunities arose for the two 
states to collaborate and cooperate with one another in shared national security objectives 
and foreign policy interests in the region. The 1979 Iranian Revolution transformed both 
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s identities to such a radical degree, taking both Saudi Arabia and 
Iran on a new path that embodied a highly competitive clash of Islamic ideologies.  
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Chapter Four: The Dawn of a New Cold War? 1979-2003 
 
In 1979, a significant event reversed the strategic balance of the Middle East, and 
this was the Iranian Revolution. The Pahlavi dynasty conclusively ended in revolution 
and the establishment of a new form of government in the Middle East, a republic that 
held a deep Islamic identity. While Iran’s Islamic message resonated in the region, it was 
the Iranian revolutionaries creation of new policies, institutions and procedures based on 
their views of Islam that challenged and renewed old tensions. Since 1979, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran’s enmity has grown and has resulted in the dissolution of relations between these 
two states as well as the establishment of two competing entities. During the time period 
of 1979-2003, confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with their allies, 
impelled these two states into a new kind of conflict, one that goes beyond the traditional 
elements of war and that more closely parallels the enmity that existed between the 
United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. Tensions amassed to not only 
represent a competition between the opposing doctrinal beliefs within Islam, but also 
perpetuated two different responses to the West, specifically the United States. 
Politically, they represented two competing systems, with Iran representing the 
revolutionary bloc and Saudi Arabia leading the status quo bloc. 
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 These two natural rivals, whose diplomatic efforts allied them during the 
previous decades, now began to compete aggressively to preserve and expand their power 
and influence in the region. While state interests vastly influenced this new Middle East 
rivalry, the ideological positions held by Saudi Arabia and Iran drove them to exploit 
sectarian and ethnic divisions, features that not only came to define their rivalry but also 
used as political tools. This section will look towards the state identity and foreign policy 
actions of Saudi Arabia and Iran in order to understand the defining features that drove 
this rivalry towards cold war status. This will include Saudi Arabia’s containment 
policies of Iran its billion-dollar soft power projection to export Wahhabism as well as its 
support of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. In looking at Iran’s role, this section will address 
Iran’s mission to export revolution and its Islamic rhetoric across the globe as well as its 
forging of new alliances with Syria and funding of terrorism in Lebanon.  
The Iranian Revolution 
By the 1970s, the Iranian population was becoming increasingly discontent with 
the despotic Shah. Iran is a historically traditional society and when the Shah sought to 
modernize and westernize Iran, he severely marginalized Iran’s Shi’ite clergy. In 
addition, political repression grew more pronounced and after the 1977 economic 
downturn, the Iranian population lost faith in the Shah’s ability to produce economic 
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decentralization.82 As a result, the enlistment of the masses towards revolution 
culminated in one of the largest revolutionary movements the world has ever seen. 
Central to this movement was the Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. Although the 
overthrow of the “the most stable Muslim governments” governed by Muhammad Reza 
Shah Pahlavi was considered monumental, the revolution signified a much greater 
transition.  
Though not the sole factor in the 1979 Revolution, religion played a major role in 
enlisting the masses towards revolution. Khomeini had actually devised the ultimate 
Islamic transformation as he motivated the masses by posing to them the objective of a 
pure Islamic government in lieu of the Shah’s corrupt authority. This ideology was 
central to the success of the revolution as scholars note that it contained both “domestic 
and indigenous origins,” thereby equipping the state with a dual legitimacy of both 
religious doctrines and popular consent.83 Led by Khomeini, the Iranian population 
believed that a vital ingredient of the reformation was the reinstitution of “true Islam.”  
They believed that freeing Iran from Western dominance and “cultural colonization,” of 
ridding Iran from Pahlavi’s secular influences and instead setting up Islamic political and 
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economic institutions would provide solutions for all of Iran’s problems.84 The overthrow 
of the Shah not only marked a “rare occasion” where Islamists have successfully taken 
over a constituted political authority, but where Shi’ite Islamists, who have long 
maintained a quietist political stance towards government, were able to accomplish this 
feat.85 
Iran and Saudi Arabia 
One major outcome of the Iranian Revolution was the political empowerment of 
the ulama and the imposition of his theocratic doctrine. Khomeini advocated for direct 
clerical rule, velayat-e faqih (rule by supreme Islamic jurisprudence).  This is unique as 
while many revolutions have had religious ideologies, the establishment of clerical rule 
post revolution was an entirely new concept. In addition, he re- established the legal and 
religious authority of the Shi’ite mojtahed’s and was ultimately concerned with 
reinforcing the “Islam of the past.” The most important aspect of this transformation lies 
in the assignation of political authority to the political figure of the Shi’ite jurist, the 
faqih, a role that transcends the traditional organization of command and obedience in 
Shi’ism. 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s formation of the first Islamic Republic and his 
popularization of Islamic fundamentalism posed a substantial challenge to Sunni 
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sensibilities, thereby directly affecting the Saudi Kingdom. Khomeini made it clear that 
his ambitions extended beyond Iran and that he wanted to be accepted as the leader of the 
Muslim world. Khomeini was vastly popular in the Shi’ite world and quickly rose to be 
seen as a Shi’ite leader through his appeal to Shi’ite popular beliefs and myths.  He also 
aimed to transpose the Iranian Revolution as an Islamic Revolution, so that Sunnis would 
accept his authority. In its publication regarding the Sunni and Shi’ite divide, the Council 
on Foreign Relations explains that Iran began its Islamic experiment by trying to inspire 
Islamic revivalism throughout the Muslim world. Although it preached Muslim unity, 
Iran “supported groups in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, [Saudi Arabia, 
etc.] that had specific Shia agendas.”86 
Much of Khomeini’s activist tendencies are a product of historical context. 
Specifically, the encroachment of modernity via European colonialism and post-World 
War Two western interference by the two camps of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. As such, he focused his attention on anti-Israel and anti-American (“the 
outsiders”) rhetoric and activism. As an additional target of these idealist claims, 
Khomeini sought to delegitimize Saudi Arabia. Khomeini saw the Saudi monarchy as a 
mere extension of American interference and aimed to overthrow what he viewed to be a 
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corrupt and unpopular dictatorship, using the same methods that he used to successfully 
overthrow the Iranian Shah. 87 
At first, relations remained fairly friendly. Saudi Arabia immediately recognized 
the new government and King Khalid send a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini congratulating 
the success of the new republic and expressed their willingness to continue their good 
relations and cooperation stressing that “Islamic solidarity” could form the basis of close 
ties between the two countries.88 The second deputy Prime Minister, Prince Abdullah bin 
Abd al-Aziz further elaborated this position regarding cooperation between Saudi Arabia 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran,  
Islam is the organizer of our relations. Muslims interests are the goals of our 
activities and the Holy Qur’an is the constitution of both countries....the fact is 
that we are very relieved by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy making islam, 
not heavy armaments, the organizer of cooperation, a base for dialogue, and the 
introduction to a prosperous and dignified future.89 
By mid-1979, Khomeini began to define Iran’s role as one of exporting the 
revolution and of protecting the rights of the Shi’ites in neighboring countries. The new 
constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran even announced these “Islamic” overtures 
and outlined its intention to form a “single world community.” Khomeini began this 
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strive for a single Islamic community under Khomeinism by focusing on various Islamic 
groups within the Middle East in order to secure unity on political, economic and cultural 
fronts.  Iran targeted Saudi Arabia as a focal point to spread revolution, constantly 
voicing their contempt of the Saudi government and encouraging young followers and 
other Shi’ites to demonstrate their support of the true Islamic regime, Iran. For Instance, 
Khomeini sent individuals to stage protests during the annual Hajj in order to spread its 
revolutionary message to the millions of Muslims visiting from around the world. He also 
made public statement ridiculing Saudi Arabia’s namesake (the royal family) and further 
claiming that the Saudi government was neither legitimate nor genuinely Islamic.90 He 
accused Saudi Arabia, as the center of Wahhabism of constant espionage and sedition. 
Although Khomeini’s idealist aims to unify Sunnis and Shi’ites managed to escalate anti-
Americanism throughout the region, he underestimated the distrust that Sunnis had for 
the Shi’ites. Furthermore, while Iran may have constantly publicly dismissed any divide 
between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims, their constant support of Shi’ite parties in the region 
suggested a deeper commitment to the members of their own sect. Sunni Islamists, such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood, although deeply admired Khomeini’s success, did not accept 
his leadership. Furthermore, when Khomeini called for control of Mecca and Medina, 
under current guardianship of Saudi Arabia, Khomeini was dismissed. The Sunnis saw 
Khomeini's idealism as a Shi’ite plot.  
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The results of the revolution created an immense sectarian battle between Sunnis 
and Shi’ites. While Iran and Saudi Arabia have extensive military means and economic 
capabilities, they both understood that neither actually have the resources to establish 
dominance over each other via such “hard power” means. Through this realization, the 
way that Saudi Arabia and Iran sought regional influence was actually through the 
dissemination of their cultural and political wars, specifically via the core religiosity of 
the Middle East population.91 The bond formed via Saudi Arabia’s prior strategy of 
strengthening Islamic identity was renewed with vigor in order to thwart Khomeini and 
contain the Shi’ite resurgence. Investment from oil wealth gave the Kingdom the ability 
to not only resist Khomeini’s challenge of a “Shia Revival” but also the means to 
influence the Muslim world to usurp Iran’s message.92 Consequently, Saudi Arabia began 
to encourage sectarianism, inducing a more profound Sunni identity against the Shi’ites 
and also encouraging Sunni governments to subdue Islamic activism and any attempts of 
political reform.93 This image of Saudi Arabia as the Sunni defender and the creation of a 
strong Sunni identity (as a contrast to Shi’ism) pushed Wahhabism towards a concerning 
direction that would have dire consequences in the region. Many regional experts provide 
much evidence of a causal link between these sectarian policies and Sunni extremism. 
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The Saudi petrodollar enabled Saudi Arabia to push a geographical distribution of 
Salafism, the export version of Wahhabism through the entirety of the Middle East and 
North African region. Vali Nasr writes, “the band of radical Islam that began spreading 
across Central Asia and the Caucasus in the 1990s...was a Sunni radicalism born of the 
deliberate Saudi policy of containing Iran.”94  
 Saudi Arabia’s beliefs regarding the forms and rules of government has led the 
country to use Wahhabism to consolidate and pursue state power. The discovery and 
nationalization of Saudi Aramco completed Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. The 
outward flow of oil and influx of money enabled Saudi Arabia to pursue its goals of 
spreading Wahhabism across the Muslim world in order to “wahhabise” Islam into a 
single monolithic creed. Saudi Arabia’s billion-dollar soft power projection to export 
Wahhabism has severely impacted the region and has played a major role in shaping the 
current sectarian politics that continues to dominate and divide the Middle East.  
Oil Profits and Wahhabism 
The discovery of and nationalization of Saudi Aramco completed Saudi Arabia’s 
influence in the region.  On May 19, 1933 the signing of an agreement between the Saudi 
minister of finance and a representative of Standard Oil of California signified a major 
development in the region and forever changed the dynamic of Saudi politics. As Bernard 
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Lewis explains, “Saudi politics and Wahhabi doctrines now rested on a solid economic 
foundation.”95  
As the French scholar Giles Kepel describes, Saudi goals were, and still are, to 
spread Wahhabism across the Muslim world and it has invested billions of dollars into 
this manifestation as the self-proclaimed manager of Sunni Islam.96 As aforementioned, 
Saudi Arabia was already an influential government in Islam as the “Custodian of the two 
holy sites” of Islam and the host of the annual pilgrimage, hajj, where millions of 
Muslims from all around the world come to participate. The discovery of oil, however, 
allowed Saudi Arabia to further this influence, as they were now in a position to provide 
their Wahhabi teachers and religious figures with the financial resources to promote and 
spread their brand of Islam. According to various literatures, it has been estimated that in 
the past two decades Saudi Arabia has spent at least $87 billion propagating Wahhabism 
abroad. The funding has been said to go towards the construction and operating expenses 
of religious institutions (madrasas, mosques, etc.) that sermonize Wahhabism. This 
funding also goes towards the training of imams, dominating mass media and publishing 
outlets, and distributing Wahhabi textbooks. In fact, in some Muslim countries, Wahhabi 
sponsored schools and colleges represent the only education available. The exploitation 
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of oil has therefore enabled Saudi Arabia to carry their message all over the Islamic 
world and to Islamic minority communities, including Europe and North America.97 
 Evidence of Saudi Arabia’s soft power projection can also be seen in many 
Western countries. As Joseph Nye explains, soft power rests on the ability to shape the 
preferences of others.  Saudi Arabia has an attractive traditional and religious culture and 
has created hundreds of Wahhabi institutes around the world to further its reach. In his 
book, The Crisis of Islam, Bernard Lewis writes that even in European and North 
American countries, where the quality of public education is high, Saudi Arabia’s 
Wahhabi institutions provide for Muslim families a place where they can receive an 
Islamic education. In some cases, these institutes represent the only means for new 
converts and for Muslim parents to provide their children with access to learn religious 
and cultural tradition. Such institutions include but are not limited to “private schools, 
mosques schools, holiday camps, and increasingly, prisons.”98 The profits from oil wealth 
are essential for these soft power objectives to be successful as financial resources 
sometimes provide the only means for religious institutes to assert their presence and 
influence. This is true in countries where funding for schooling is low or nonexistent, or 
even in countries where governments remove themselves from religious matters.  
Saudi Arabia’s soft power investment to manage Sunni Islam also solidified its 
role in international politics, strengthening its alliance with the United States. The 
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alliance between the two countries first occurred in 1945 in a meeting between Roosevelt 
and Abd-al Aziz ibn Saud on board the USS Quincy and continues until today.99 As noted 
in Crookes article “westerners looked at the Kingdom and their gaze was taken by the 
wealth; by the apparent modernization; by the professed leadership of the Islamic world. 
They chose believe that the Kingdom was bending to the imperatives of modern life.”100 
When Saudi Arabia nationalized oil in 1974, rising oil prices literally filled Saudi 
reserves with billions of dollars. This increase in oil profits allowed the kingdom to 
subsidize various Islamic causes through charities and funds such as Rabita al-Alam al-
Islam. Oil profits furthered Saudi’s claim to leadership in the Islamic world as well, 
transitioning its influence for not only sponsoring Islamic activism but also accelerated its 
ideological expansion. From Africa to Southeast Asia, thousands of Islam’s most 
prominent and aspiring preachers and scholars travelled to Saudi Arabia to study Islamic 
thought and joined Saudi funded research institutes. These individuals then returned to 
their homeland or travelled to other places abroad, spreading Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi 
message. Vali Nasr notes, “many of those who studied and worked in Saudi Arabia then 
spread throughout the Muslim world to teach and work at Saudi-funded universities, 
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schools, mosques, and research institutes.” He furthers his point by explaining that these 
individuals, in effect, have become ambassadors of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi traditions 
and religion, “influenced by the harsh simplicities of Wahhabi theology and financially 
dependent on Saudi patronage, work not only to entrench conservative attitudes….but 
also defend Saudi Arabia’s interests and legitimacy.”101 This investment of oil wealth in 
Islamic causes implanted Wahhabism educationally, socially and culturally throughout 
Islamic lands and produced powerful actors ranging from policy makers to social activists 
entrenched in leading religious, educational and political establishments. The enormous 
influx of wealth encouraged Saudi Arabia to seek a hegemonic position. In addition, it 
has allowed Saudi Arabia to maintain its old belief system regarding the role of 
governance while pursuing its vested interests both at home and abroad. Thus, this so 
called “petrodollar” actually fueled the ambitions of Saudi political leaders to spread 
Wahhabism as a political means to consolidate and pursue state power and authority.  
Forging New Alliances 
Saudi Arabia:  
Saudi Arabia and Iran are gripped in a zero-sum game, contesting for land, 
resources, weapons and, most specifically, influence. While Saudi Arabia and Iran were 
indeed rivals from the inception of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, tensions escalated to an 
unprecedented degree after Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, where Shi’ite Muslims 
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successfully overthrew the pro-Western Shah’s constituted political authority. In 
summation, perceiving Iranian actions and rhetoric as a major threat to its influence in the 
Middle East, Saudi Arabia developed a foreign policy strategy to contain and counter 
Iran. 
In addition to its export of Wahhabism, another manner in which Saudi Arabia 
pursued reciprocal containment was through the formation of alliances and the support of 
any event that would counter Iran’s ideological and geopolitical interests in the region.  
The Iran-Iraq war was a significant event as although the war was instigated by 
Saddam’s Ba’athist regime, the real battle that took place was a fight to contain Iran’s 
ideological and geopolitical role in the region.102 One of the forefront issues that divided 
these two countries ranged from the long-standing cultural rivalry between Arab and 
Persian civilizations. Thus, even though Saudi Arabia had its own issues with Iraq, the 
advent of the Islamic Republic and its militant Shi’ite outsourcing caused Saudi Arabia 
and its allies in the international system, including the United States to provide highly 
advanced weaponry to the Ba'athist regime. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar (and the smaller 
Gulf States) Egypt, Jordan, and other conservative Arab countries (with the exception of 
Syria) provided Saddam with political and financial support, perceiving Iraq’s fight as an 
extension of their own security struggles, as Iran’s ideological Khomeinism was 
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anathema.103 In fact, together with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia supplied Iraq with roughly fifty 
to sixty billion dollars worth of assistance.104 The Iran-Iraq war was the longest 
conventional war of the twentieth century, one that cost hundred of billions of dollars and 
took thousands of lives. This war is an example of how the revolution transformed Iran 
from being Saudi Arabia’s strategic partner, if not ally, in the region to Saudi Arabia’s 
main ideological rival. 
 Containing Iran’s regional role also resulted in the formation of various 
organizations and coalitions, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in which 
Saudi Arabia has played a central role in the regional politics concerning the Gulf. The 
GCC was monumental in containing Iran’s political evolution. The GCC has also served 
as a dominant instrument for US influence and as a means to curb Iran’s role in the 
region’s political and security concerns. By coordinating military/security arrangements 
in the region, Saudi Arabia and other GCC members joined the West in their coercive 
economic sanctions against Iran helped implement campaigns to pass political resolutions 
condemning Iran. As a result of the GCC’s support for US policies, GCC countries 
received large advances weapons deals and were signed under the defensive nuclear 
umbrella of the United States. All of which was under the security requisite to counter 
and contain the Iranian threat.  
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Iran 
On its end, Iran continued to look for ways to challenge the regional order, such 
as supporting Hezbollah and Hamas and allying with Syria’s Assad regime. When 
Khomeini rose to power, one of his main goals was support the formation of Islamic 
government and various Islamic groups. The Syrian-Iranian relationship is one that is 
worth taking a great look at. When Hafez al- Assad took power in September of 1970, he 
sought to make Syria into a power among the Arabs. Assad ruled through the Ba’ath 
Party, using its secular ideology as a means to bring the Alawite minority into key 
positions. Eventually, the Alawites, who once made up the servant class, held positions 
that ranged from commanders of special forces to intelligence to the armored corps. 
Additionally, Assad exploited the minorities’ existential fear with regard to the Sunni 
majority and even campaigned against the Sunnis through massive and indiscriminate 
violence, deliberately radicalizing them.105  Assad, though initially inspired by Arab 
nationalism advocated by Egypt’s President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, became embittered by 
the constant scheming and backstabbing among Arab states that countered the rhetoric of 
unity.106 It is in light of this regional political reality that Iran and Syria became what 
many experts dub as the “odd couple.” When the Ayatollah Khomeini came into power in 
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1979, he recognized the Alawites as branch of the Shi’ites. Essentially, establishing 
political and cultural relations was based on Syria and Iran’s shared heritage, and the 
concepts of anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism.107For instance, in the cultural agreement 
made between post-Revolutionary Iran and Syria, the opening paragraph laid out a 
concordance that began with the belief that they share a cultural heritage and civilization, 
a history that represents the struggle of two peoples, and with this foundation of friendly 
relations between two brother peoples, the two states expanded their cultural relations in 
line with the politics of resistance of both Zionism and Western Imperialism.108 
Syria and Iran entered an alliance for strategic purposes. Both Syria and Iran had 
clear geopolitical interests and this alliance provided them with the opportunity to 
promote their influence in the region. Initially, the two countries allied themselves with 
one another during the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq had long been Syria’s competitor for 
supremacy in the Arab world and Syria became Iran's only and therefore crucial Arab ally 
in its war against Iraq.  Additionally, for Iran, Syria represented the state with access to 
the Shi’ite community in Lebanon that was currently the midst of a civil war. Lebanon 
became a major goal for Iran as Iran hoped to not only increase its influence in the 
region, but it also made Lebanon a crucial location for Iran to continue to export its 
revolution and continue its targeted attacks against Israel. As aforementioned, Syria and 
Iran were firmly in opposition and vastly antagonistic to the state of Israel. The civil war 
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in Lebanon led to the foundation of Hezbollah, a radical Shi’ite non-state actor based in 
the south of Lebanon who constantly engaged Israel’s army in guerrilla warfare. Both 
Iran and Syria greatly supported Hezbollah. Syria’s geographic location provided Iran 
with the opportunity and access to influence the Shi’ite community in Lebanon by 
increasing the radical Shi’ite militias and by funding, training and arming them. 
Hezbollah became Iran’s most important non-state actor ally in the Middle East. This is 
one important example of how Iran’s competition for influence in the region has 
catapulted it to mobilize its resources in order to keep and gain friends.  
By the mid 1980s, Saudi Arabia and Iran enmity had escalated to such a degree 
that the two nations began to utilize sectarianism as a means to undermine each others 
religious authority and security. Both countries embraced a state identity that was highly 
dependent on Muslim causes. Iran used Khomeinism to spread its revisionist message 
and took its role of vilayat-i faqih very seriously. On its end, Saudi Arabia focused its 
regional agenda on preserving the status quo, believing its Islamic leadership as a state 
chosen by God integral to the region's security and stability. The clash and intense rivalry 
that ensued produced a clash of two very distinct discourses regarding the regional order 
of the Middle East.  
 On every issue that presented itself, Saudi Arabia and Iran pitted themselves 
against the other, locking themselves in a cycle of vicious enmity and rivalry. In 1987, 
during the annual Muslim pilgrimage, a time when the city of Mecca is open to all 
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Muslims, a tradition that stipulates that all forms of strife and bloodshed are forbidden, 
became a site of tragedy. Iranian pilgrims were sent to demonstrate and riot and clashed 
with Saudi Arabian security forces in a confrontation that was so bloody that it claimed 
the lives of over four hundred individuals. While Saudi Arabia blamed Iran entirely for 
the incident, claiming it to be provoked and premeditated violence, Iran and their 
sympathizers labeled the event a premeditated massacre, where Saudi security forces has 
conspired to kill Iranian pilgrims. The traditional peace of the pilgrimage was destroyed 
by the Iranian-Saudi conflict, a time when the confrontation between two rivals of Islam 
escalated to a point of no return. For three years, Iranians boycotted the pilgrimage and 
Saudi Arabia completely severed ties with Iran, making it impossible for Iranian pilgrims 
to secure visas. In 1988, on the first anniversary of the 1987 Mecca incident, Khomeini 
gave a speech that provided to a historical analogy, alluding to Sunni and Shi’ite 
historical conflict, portraying the Saudis as Sunni agents whose aim was to annihilate and 
inflict massive pain on the Sh’ite Muslims,109 
The sword of blasphemy and division, which has been hidden in the hypocritical 
cloak of Yazid’s followers and descendants of the Umayyad dynasty, God’s curse 
be upon them, had to come out again from the same cloak of Abu Sufyan's heirs 
to destroy and Kill.110 
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s normative divergence of foreign policy regarding 
regional security and stability found its way on the battlefield of Afghanistan's war with 
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the Russians. The 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan coincided with Iran’s Islamic 
revolution. Khomeini, whose recent estrangement with the United States over the Iranian 
hostage crisis and their war with Iraq entangled Iran in a multitude of domestic and 
international problems. While Iran was cautious not to antagonize the Soviet Union, it did 
immediately condemn the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and demanded its 
withdrawal. Eventually, however as the Cold War between the Soviet Union and Iran 
reached the Afghan frontier, Khomeini maintained relations with both the Soviet Union 
and its own satellite regime in Kabul. Iran saw the Soviet Union as a counterweight to US 
influence in the region. Furthermore, in conjunction with its own revisionist mission and 
desire to counter Saudi Arabia’s spread of Wahhabism in the region, Iran supported the 
Hazara Shi’ites (constituted 20 percent of Afghan population) in Afghanistan as a means 
to battle the US-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan axis that financed and managed the Afghan 
resistance against the Soviets.111 When the Cold War ended and the United States and 
Soviet Union pulled out Afghanistan in 1989, the war-torn state became a battleground 
for a proxy war among Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. After a long battled with Iraq, 
Iran was desperately in need of allies in the region and thus sought to establish a friendly 
government in Kabul that reflected Iran’s revolutionary aims.  
On its end, Saudi Arabia saw the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan as an 
external threat to Saudi security, as the Soviet Union’s invasion led it closer to the Gulf 
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and even empowered radical Arab states, such as South Yemen, to overthrow Arab 
leaders. As part of Saudi Arabia’s new religious state identity, Saudi Arabia saw 
Afghanistan as an important campaign to promote Wahhabi Islam and contain Shi’ite 
expansionism abroad.  In the early 1980s, Saudi Arabia sent its youth to join the war in 
Afghanistan and even offered financial assistance to the Afghan Arabs, political Sunni 
fundamentalist Islamic movement—Pashtun mujahedeen—such as Hezb-e Islamic. When 
Afghanistan descended into a devastating civil war, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran all 
rejected the new government and thus made every attempt to undermine it in order to 
pursue a victory that would create a new power alignment in line with their visionary 
goals. Saudi Arabia and Iran continued to push the Pashtun and Shi’ite groups to continue 
their in fighting by providing them with weapons, training and financials. Additionally, 
while Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran fought over influence on the Afghan turf, as did 
the Afghan warlords who had rose to power and prominence during their fight against the 
Soviets. Fueling the civil war was also to their benefit and they created their own 
fiefdoms, forming fleeting alliances with high bidders.  
Eventually, the Taliban, a young Pashtun religious group influenced by 
Wahhabism, rose to power. By 1996, they had overthrown President Rabbani, which 
signified a monumental victory for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as Sunni states and a major 
defeat for Iran on an economic, ideological and security level. Unwilling to give up, Iran 
supported the formation of an anti-Taliban coalition composed of Tajik, Uzbek and 
Hazara factions. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan continued to support the Taliban and for its 
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part, the Taliban backed Sunni Islamist militants launching attacks against the Iranian 
regime. By the end of 1998, the Taliban forces had captured a major Shi’ite town, Mazar-
e Sharif in northern Afghanistan from an Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and 
massacred thousands of Hazara Shiites in addition to nine Iranian diplomats. In reaction, 
Iran amassed over 250,000 troops along the Afghanistan border, ready to engage in 
military confrontation.112  Thus, the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the propagandization 
of religious legitimacy via the politicization of the of differences between Sunnism and 
Shi’ism not only contributed to a deepened hostility between the two Muslim states, but a 
complete severing of relations by 1988. 
Saudi-Iranian Détente 
In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini died, leaving Iran with a relatively strong and 
centralized government, but with major political, economic and social issues. In 1989, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took Khomeini's place as the Supreme Leader of Iran and in 
August, Hashemi Rafsanjani, a “pragmatist” was elected as President.113 This change in 
leadership and need to reconstruct the economy and Iran’s image and geographic 
conditions paved the way for Saudi-Iranian détente.  
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 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 helped the restoration of relations 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia and with several additional Arab states. This changing 
regional landscape in addition to changes in leadership in both states (King Prince 
Abdullah in Saudi Arabia) facilitated an easing of relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran.  By 1991, Saudi Arabia and Iran had come to reach an agreement on the hajj. While 
throughout most of the 1990s, Saudi Iranian relations remained primarily stagnant and 
complicated, in the later portion of the decade, when Khatami was elected as President of 
Iran, additional shifts in relations helped pave the way to normalize relations.114 When 
Khatami took over in 1997, Saudi Arabia and Iran united on additional issues such as 
drug and smuggling trafficking. Additionally, the fall of oil prices in the late 1990s 
brought the two states together, in order to cut oil production and increases prices. Saudi 
Arabia and Iran also had common interests regarding Iraq, security and the Arab-Israeli 
peace process.115  
What is most important to note about this détente era, is that despite the 
exceptional improvement in bilateral relations, a number of important issues remained 
unresolved. Saudi Arabia and Iran did not have a “meeting of the minds on foreign 
policy.”116 The geopolitical circumstances of the late 1990’s Saudi-Iranian 
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rapprochement allowed for this improvement of bilateral relations to occur, however they 
were unable to form a security alliance or even establish an understand of each other’ 
regional international politics. For instance, as aforementioned, they had vast differences 
and even a proxy war of sorts regarding the Afghanistan, as they supported opposing 
factions. Also, while Riyadh tolerated the Madrid Conference in October of 1991 
regarding the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Tehran greatly contested any form of 
peace with Israel, citing it as slowing the process on larger cooperation regarding 
common regional security issues.117 Iran’s attempt to assert its claims over other GCC 
territories was another issue that prevented relations from being completely normalized.  
Conclusion 
Ultimately, this section clearly shows that the Islamic Revolution of 1979 altered 
relations to such a degree that the Saudi-Iranian rivalry encapsulated an enmity that 
justifies defining it as an enduring rivalry. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 altered the 
state identity of both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Where once Iran was a state that advocated 
its foreign policy towards preserving the status quo, the revolution transformed it into a 
radical state with a revisionist policy aiming to transform the entire region under a single 
Islamic unity, Khomeinism, and a region that would uphold all of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran’s norms and values. Saudi Arabia’s reactions to Iran’s rhetoric and actions created an 
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even more conservative state. Utilizing its economic fortune, Saudi Arabia aimed its 
foreign policy at countering and containing revolutionary Iran and built institutions, both 
at home and abroad, to advance its Islamic revivalist movements under its Wahhabi 
version of Islam. The result was a religious nationalism, which occurs when, the 
“preservation of traditional values is linked to the preservation of the nation or the state 
as a citadel of religious values.”118 
The heated rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran envelops both the complex 
histories regarding Sunnis and Shi’ites and the centuries of political contestation that is 
now embodied by the modern nation States of Saudi Arabia and Iran. This question of 
religious legitimacy is so intrinsically tied to these two Muslim states that when Iran’s 
revolution began advocating itself as the protector of Islam and incited revolutionary zeal 
across the Shi’ite minority populations, Saudi Arabia tightened its own unique claim to 
the state and its status protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The outbreak of 
the Iran-Iraq war the following year further complicated relations between these two 
great Gulf States. Saudi Arabia was expected to contain Iranian influence and the 
opportunity to do so was presented and evidenced by its support and involvement in the 
Iran-Iraq war, attempting to bolster Saddam Hussein against Shi’ite influence. 
Afghanistan also presented another opportunity for both Iran and Saudi Arabia to push 
their normative orders on the regional scene.  
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Saudi Arabia and Iran sought regional and external alliances in their quest as well. 
Iran reached out to Syria and helped fund, arm and train Hezbollah during the Lebanese 
Civil War also provided Iran with access to influence regional politics in Lebanon and 
further its anti-Israel policies via an Islamic fundamentalist non-state actor. Saudi Arabia 
sought to further its alliance with the United States and the European Union in addition to 
forming new coalitions composed of the Arab Gulf States, neighboring powerful Sunni 
states and funding and influencing the new political power of the Taliban, who further 
supported Sunni fighting militia forces against Shi’ite influences.  
 Deteriorating diplomatic relations reached an all time low in 1987 when 450 
pilgrims, mostly Iranian, were killed by Saudi security forces during the annual hajj. Both 
countries increased their sectarian rhetoric, locking the two states in a vicious cycle of 
competition, enmity and suspicion. While diplomatic relations were somewhat restored 
during the formative years of the 1990s, following the death of Khomeini, and 
rapprochement occurred in the latter years of the 1990s, a common understanding of 
regional international politics and a security alliances was not formed. Ultimately, while 
reconciliation did seem apparent, the deep exchanges of enmity and hatred prevailed. The 
cold war that seemed to come to a halt in the 1990’s was renewed with vigor following 
the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The Middle East has therefore found itself in the throes 
of heated tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, representing a competition between 
opposing doctrinal beliefs with Islam and vastly differing political systems.
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Chapter Five: Saudi Arabia and Iran’s Growing Rivalry 2003-2011 
 
The events of 2003 and the American-led Invasion in Iraq completely changed the 
power of balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This thesis will discuss how sectarian 
violence has taken root after the 2003 invasion and how Iran’s regional influence has 
increased as its allies in the region have accumulated power. In order to understand this 
struggle for Middle East hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia, this section will 
explore the political, religious and security dimensions of this struggle. This section will 
analyze the consequences of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear program and in addition, will map 
out the geography of the conflicts, specifically regarding Iraq, Yemen, The Palestinian 
Territories and Lebanon. 
Sectarianism in Iraq  
“Authoritarian states appear to draw life from ethnic or religious intolerance as a way of 
justifying the degree of violence required to maintain power.”119 
In attempting to understand the modern Middle East and why the current 
environment consists of continuous violence and chaos, it is important to readdress the 
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schism that exists between the Sunnis and the Shi’ites. The issue of sectarianism has the 
potential to present itself wherever people of different faiths live in close proximity to 
one another. Traditionally, sectarianism has been explained as an institutional set of 
arrangements that determines familial, local, regional and even global loyalties or 
affiliations.120 It has been shown that sectarian conflict leads to what experts identify as 
sectarian violence, which implies “a symmetrical confrontation between two or more 
non-state actors representing different population groups.”121 This definition refers to 
violence between members of different sects (inter-sectarian violence) and violence 
between different groups in the same sect (intra-sectarian violence). In the recent years, 
the Muslim world has experienced an increase in sectarian conflict, which in this case, 
has begun to be the result of the collapse of authoritarian rule and a struggle for political 
power, specifically, over which interpretation of Islam will influence societies and the 
next generation of leaders.122 
While keeping in mind the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two 
regarding ethnic and religious identity, this section will address how sectarian conflict 
was further inflamed by the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Postcolonial Iraq was 
established in 1921. The creation of a state post World War I was artificial, in that it was 
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drawn up to match the geopolitical imperial interests of the British and the French. States 
were created not necessarily to provide self-determination to the multiple indigenous 
groups living in the area at the time, but rather to create a state that would meet the 
political and economic interests of colonial powers in the region.123 This also meant that 
the founding government would not be immediately viewed as legitimate by the 
population that they were contracted to govern. In addition, Iraq consists of a highly 
diverse ethnic and religious population; Kurds, Sunnis and Shi’ites fissure Iraqi 
demographics. An urban-rural divide further heightens these divides.124 These artificial 
governments were faced with not only needing to find a way to earn the consent of the 
governed, but to also fuse these very distinct and often conflicting ethnic and religious 
identities. 
After the establishment of Iraq, the Arab Sunni population, a mere minority of the 
Iraqi population, began its authoritarian rule. For the next 82 years, the Sunnis dominated 
in Iraq and the Shi’ites were brutally suppressed and marginalized. This oppression was 
particularly apparent under Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party.125 For instance, the 
Shi’ite community was mainly centered in the Southern region of Iraq. Saddam Hussein 
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would purposefully neglect these Shi’ite communities by restricting them from meeting 
their basic human needs, including psychological well-being. He would neglect and 
starve these cities of required services, drain their wetlands so that they could not shelter 
rebels, and would ruthlessly assault the Shi’ite community. In addition, the Ba’thists 
systematically murdered Shi’ite popular religious figures and banned Shi’ite festivals and 
celebrations.126 Thus, although the political rulers presented themselves as nationally 
oriented, the fact remains that the Sunni minority constituted the ruling elite at the 
expense of the Shi’ite majority, creating a system of resentment.  
It is important to note here that during the first 80 years of Iraq’s history, the 
sectarian identity of the Iraqi populace was not primarily relevant to the political agenda 
of Iraq’s leaders. Rather, they built state institutions with the purpose of narrowing the 
vast divides between the ethnic and religious groups in order to indoctrinate them under 
the secular ideology of an all encompassing nationalism.127 This does not mean that the 
sectarian conflict did not exist or present itself in the 80 years, for this structure did in 
fact present both problems and opportunities for the ruling classes. The difference 
rendered is that the political institutions consistently presented themselves as national 
institutions and propagated their national agendas.   
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 On September 11, 2001 a terrorist attack occurred in the United States, causing 
the Bush administration to launch its “global war on terror.” In 2001, a U.S. combat 
mission into Afghanistan was launched, Operation Enduring Freedom, which targeted al- 
Qaeda training camps. As part of the “continuing” effort to fight this war on terror, the 
United States invaded Iraq in 2003. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq was also part of a 
broader U.S. plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein and establish a democratic model in a 
Middle Eastern nation.128 Not only did the American invasion fail to establish the sought 
after basis for democratic modernization in the region, but the fall of Baghdad led to the 
unmolding of the “unified” Iraqi identity. Iraq’s discord and tensions unleashed an 
entrenched sectarian mindset that was exploited as various local Sunni and Shi’ite groups 
(including extremists) fought for control.  
 When the U.S. launched their campaign in March of 2003, the Shi’ite community, 
led by Iraq’s grand ayatollah, Sayyid al-Sistani, did not resist the American march to 
Baghdad. They saw a great opportunity presented to them, the ability to sway the 
Americans to their side in order to establish political dominance. As Vali Nasr describes 
in his book, “the only face of Shi’ism revealed itself to American troops as they entered 
one of Shi’ism’s holiest cities was a distinctly quiescent and even spiritual one.”129 The 
Americans interpreted this acquiescence as a “pro-American stance” and saw the Shi’ite 
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community as the quintessential hatchery to implement its interests of building a 
democratic, secular, and economically prosperous Middle East. The United States, 
through its early alliance with the Shi’ites, helped reshape Iraq by bringing about the fall 
of the Saddam regime and the subsequent end to the Sunni rule over Iraq. Al-Sistani was 
monumental in bringing about this “Shi’ite revival” and understood that for Shi’ites to 
continue to remain powerful, they would need to build upon a unified identity that is 
common to all Shi’ites.  
 For many Sunnis, the United States “de-ba’athification” of political institution 
was not a positive sign. When the United States further disbanded the Iraqi military, both 
Sunni religious and political leaders felt alienated and greatly angered. They began to 
lash out by reverting back to their sectarian roots. For instance, the Sunni leaders accused 
the Shi’ites of being the “cat’s paws” of an Iranian campaign to control Iraq. 
Furthermore, in 2005, the United Iraq Alliance, a Shi’ite political organization, selected a 
Prime Minister candidate who won 48 percent of the vote and roughly half of the seats in 
Parliament. Not only did this confirm the Shi’ite dominance, but it also angered many 
Shi’ites, viewing it as further proof of Iran’s influence in Iraq, as most of the government 
officials who won had maintained close ties with Iran since the 1980’s. The Sunni’s 
increased their rhetoric regarding the claim that Shi’ites were not true Muslims, but were 
in fact imposters masquerading as Muslims. Prejudices regarding the Shi’ite grew more 
pronounced including “Shi’ites have tails and they are provincial, plebeian and 
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uncouth.130 In contrast, the Shi’ites, under the guide of al-Sistani, united under a single 
Shi’ite identity. When Al Maliki came to power, he used these “de-ba’athification” laws 
to keep members of Saddam Hussein's regime out of government. Although the election 
results were in favor Maliki and his Shi’ite allies, they did not win by enough votes to 
form a government that could rule without any coalition partners. Though many Shi’ites 
did not agree to the politics of the Maliki government, they had the desire to protect and 
promote their Shi’ite identity.  
 This marginalization of Sunnis actually established a Sunni identity. The summer 
of 2005 gave rise to violent sectarianism. Sunnis, who believed that many of the Iraqi 
security operations were sectarian provocations, began to rebel. When attacks on Sunni 
mosques and clerics grew more pronounced, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formed the Umar 
Brigade to target Shi’ites. This resulted in massive suicide bombings aimed at “ordinary” 
Shi’ites, ranging from policemen, community leaders, children at play, people at work, 
people during prayer and aimed at locations such as markets, hospitals, etc.131 Although 
the rebellion movement does contain elements of religious fanaticism, not all members 
are religious extremists. Scholars have explained that there are many Sunnis who review 
this rebellion as a revolution of sorts, a nationalist movement.132 Unfortunately, the 
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United States did not realize this in time: the Shi’ites claim for Iraq not only changed the 
balance of power between the Sunnis and the Shi’ites in Iraq, but also changed the 
balance of power between the Sunnis and Shi’ites in the entire Middle East.  
Sectarianism is as much a product of time and place as it is an exploitation of identity. 
When attempting to understand the Sunni-Shi’ite divide, it is important to note that 
sectarianism is being used as a form of ethno-religious political mobilization since 
religion is a key factor of one’s identity within the Muslim world.133 Furthermore, 
political leaders began to think strategically in sectarian terms and began to shape their 
domestic and foreign policies in these terms.134 What began as a political rivalry evolved 
into mass conflict and chaos, reverting individuals back to their most basic sectarian 
identity. When the U.S. invaded and occupied Iraq, it toppled one of the three largest 
Sunni powers in the region and instituted competitive elections that led a Shi’ite majority 
to dominate the parliament and produce its prime ministers, creating the first Arab Shi’ite 
state.  
 The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Iraq  
The fall of Saddam’s regime and the ensuing Shi’ite rise to power did not go 
unnoticed in either Riyadh or Tehran. In fact, when looking at the civil war conflict in 
Iraq, it is more beneficial to view the conflict in terms of the aims and goals of Iran and 
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Saudi Arabia and how these two regimes continue to use Islam as an instrument to further 
their political power and become the ultimate hegemon in the Middle East. The removal 
of Saddam Hussein and the civil war in Iraq have changed the regional security 
paradigm, engaging Saudi Arabia and Iran in a struggle for power. Iraq, once perceived 
as a hostile enemy to both Saudi Arabia and Iran, is now more than ever a central 
concern. Neither state wishes to content with the emergence of a new hostile regime in 
Baghdad.  For Iran, Iraq is hugely important. Not only is the majority of Iraq’s population 
Shi’ite Muslims, but Iraq is also home to the Askari shrine as well as to Najaf and 
Kerbala, two holy cities in Islam, sites that represent the heart of Shi’ite history for the 
Islamic Republic.135 Since the ousting of Saddam Hussein, however, the Middle East has 
begun to see a challenge to the Sunni political prominence, making Sunni governments, 
especially Saudi Arabia fearful that they are losing their influence in the region. The 
forceful removal of Saddam Hussein has created a fear within the al-Saud family. Iran 
has made significant efforts to influence the post-Saddam Shi’ite governments, leading to 
powerful improvements in its relations with Iraq. Saudi Arabia fears that that these 
Shi’ite dominated governments in Baghdad will establish an alliance that will allow them 
to organize themselves diplomatically and perhaps even make subversion efforts, which 
would ultimately be detrimental to Saudi’s interests in the region.136 
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While Saudi Arabia had sincere concerns regarding the U.S. led invasion of Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia initially took more of a back seat to influencing the new Iraqi government. 
Following the 9/11 bombings, Saudi Arabia-U.S. relations took a major hit as fifteen of 
the hijackers were Saudis. Desiring to preserve friendly relations, Saudi Arabia slightly 
adjusted their domestic and foreign behavior in order to accommodate and provide the 
United States.137  Saudi Arabia was not fearful of an expanding U.S. regional influence, 
but rather had reservations about the 2003 U.S. led invasion for fear that the Shi’ites 
would seize control, inevitably curtailing Saudi leadership and influence. Saudi Arabia’s 
principal interests therefore can be outlined as 1) prevent instability and conflict in Iraq 
from threatening Saudi Arabia’s homeland security; 2) prevent the repression of Iraq’s 
Sunnis by the newly dominant Shi’ite government 3) limit hostile Iran’s regional 
influence.       
 As the years went on and the United States imposed de-bathification orders, Saudi 
Arabia became deeply critical of the United States policies in Iraq, viewing them as pro-
Shi’ite and anti-Sunni. In few instances, Saudi Arabia even rendered U.S. policies as 
manipulated by the Iranians.138 In an interview with the Council of Foreign Relations in 
2005, Saudi Arabian Foreign minister accused the United States of effectively handing 
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the country to Iran. When talks of an Iraqi constitution arose, Saudi Arabia began to 
voice its fears of the constitution encouraging sectarianism and splitting the country’s 
populations, further disenfranchising the Sunnis that lost power when Saddam Hussein 
was ousted by the U.S. in 2003. King Faisal warned that such a constitution and policies 
would drive Iraq into a civil war and that Iran, only interested in the Shi’ite sect of the 
population, would take advantage due to its foreign policy ambitions in the region. Faisal 
criticized the United State’s lack of foresight by claiming, “We fought a war together to 
keep Iran out of Iraq after Iraq was driven out of Kuwait...now we are handing the whole 
country over to Iran without reason.”139 
 Following the invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia completely severed ties with Iraq. 
When Saddam was toppled and the Sunni government was replaced with a predominantly 
Shi’ite government, Saudi Arabia refused to restore diplomatic ties and establish an 
embassy in Baghdad. Saudi Arabia’s failure to open an embassy was in fact a means of 
protesting this new rise of a Shi’ite led government in Iraq. In addition to this reasoning, 
Saudi Arabia feared that accepting a Shi’ite government would reignite protests from 
Saudi Arabia’s Shi’ite community. For Saudi Arabia, the Iraq War of 2003 represented a 
major foreign policy setback on the regional level.140 While Saudi Arabia did not 
necessarily become heavily involved in the initial years, Saudi Arabia took a highly 
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critical and vocal stance against Maliki. For instance, at an international conference in 
Egypt, King Abdullah refused to meet the new Prime Minister of Iraq. King Abdullah 
described Maliki as an individual “embodying sectarian divisions.”141 Saudi Arabia’s 
refusal to meet Maliki was a snub that resonated throughout the Middle East and worked 
to diminish the legitimacy and recognition of the new government. Saudi Arabia was 
greatly upset with Maliki’s lack of reaching out to Iraq’s Sunni minority to reconcile 
escalating sectarian tensions and of his refusal to address its controversial laws. For Saudi 
Arabia, the success of Iraqi reconciliation efforts and the choices made by the 
government were a major determining factor as to whether they will continue or cease to 
fear the empowerment of Shi’ite Arabs and the growth of Iranian influence. Iraq’s 
choices regarding key areas such as energy and military policy had major impacts for 
Iraqi-Saudi relations and how far Saudi Arabia was willing to go to influence Iraq and 
contain Iran.142 In light of Saudi-Iraqi diminishing relations, Saudi Arabia has also been 
accused of not closing down the border in order to allow Saudis to join the Sunni 
insurgency against the government.143  
In 2010, during the lead up to the March Iraqi election, Saudi Arabia’s deep 
concern for the growing influence of Shi’ite ruled Iran and its backing of Maliki led it to 
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become more involved in Iraqi politics and favor secular Shi’ite leader Dr. Ayad Allawi. 
Allawi led a political coalition that was friendly to Iraq’s Sunni Arab community and 
advocated for their interests and concerns. Saudi Arabia funded Dr. Allawi during his 
organization’s campaigning efforts. Additionally, Allawi maintained a highly critical 
disposition against Iran’s continued interference in the political negotiations that followed 
the election and of its meddling of Iraqi politics. Despite Saudi refutation, some observers 
have even speculated that the Saudi government may be offering financial support to 
Sunni Arabs and groups in Iraq, including tribal leaders, who are associated with the 
Awakening movement.144  
 Iran, suffering from the legacy of the protracted Iran-Iraq war, understood that it 
needed to seize upon the opportunity to influence Baghdad. Thus, from the fall of 
Saddam in 2003, Iran became highly involved in Iraqi politics. Iran’s conventional 
forces were aging and its older Russian/Soviet and Chinese aircrafts would be 
demolished in a fight against an Iraq that had modern Western supplies aircrafts and 
military technology.  In addition, Iran was appalled by the notion of the U.S. army 
increasing its influences in neighboring states of Iraq and Afghanistan.145 As a means to 
mitigate Iraqi conventional forces and U.S. influences, Iran immediately and actively 
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sought to influence post-Saddam Iraq. Iran has involved “diplomacy, economic 
investment, cover action, and cultivating Iranian clients within the Iraqi political system 
including the leadership of armed militias.”146 The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) Quds Force, known for its training of terrorist organizations and for spreading 
the revolutionary message, has been organizing, training, funding, and equipping Iraqis 
to fight against Coalition and Iraqi security forces. In fact, regarding Shi’ite militia 
groups, since 2006, U.S. military officials estimate that the Quds Force provides 
between $750,000 and $3 million worth of equipment and funding to these groups every 
month.147 These influences have been greatly felt and have resulted in many positive 
results for Iran. For instance, previous Prime Minister Maliki, constantly emphasized the 
strategic importance of an alliance between the two nations.148 Iran was instrumental in 
brokering important agreements between divergent Shi’ite groups, such as encouraging 
the formation of governing Shi'ite led coalition in the Iraqi parliament composed of 
opposing populist leader Muqtada al-Sadr and Maliki. Iran’s aims in Iraq led it to 
support and seek to develop a working relationship with all major factions in order to 
hasten the departure of the Americans from Iraq.  To Iran, Sadr’s leadership is essential 
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due to his commitment to Iran’s goals of a speedy withdrawal of all US troops and 
opposed any ties to Saudi Arabia and the United States. Additional influences stem from 
diplomatic and economic factors. In 2008, for the first time in the history of relations 
between Iran and Iraq, a high level Iranian diplomat was hosted in Iraq, President 
Ahmadinejad. Additionally, in early 2008, Iraq and Iran signed a wide variety of trade 
agreements fostering economic ties, transforming Iran into Iraq’s largest trading partner.  
Most essential to Iran’s goals and most detrimental to Iraq’s stability was its 
funding and exercise of influence via Shi’ite militia organizations. These “Special 
Groups” engaged in terrorism and military strikes against U.S. troops and against the 
Sunni Iraqi population. One such group that is well known is Sadr’s Mahdi Army, who 
at its peak strength included roughly 60,00 men. Dismantled in 2008, the Mahdi Army 
was accused of operating death squads and was armed with various weapons, including 
IEDs.149 While al-Sadr no longer holds an official title within the Iraqi government, at 
one point he held around 40 seats in the 325-member Iraqi parliament. Additional 
Iranian-supported militias in Iraq included Asaib al Haq, a brigade of over 1000 
militiamen and also Kata’ib Hezbollah, in which Iranians have supplied both of these 
groups with rocket assisted exploding projectiles, and other destructive weapons.  
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Iraq has essentially become an important testing group and proxy conflict for 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. The United States’ war in Iraq disposed of Saddam Hussein and 
its Sunni dominated government. In doing so, it empowered an oppressed Shi’ite 
population into an emboldened community that came to dominate the next regime, 
bringing conflict back to the territory of Iraq, “The change from a Sunni-dominated 
government to a Shi’a influence shifted Baghdad from ‘Riyadh's orbit into Tehran’s’ 
where it has remained for the past decade, much to Saudi Arabia’s discontent.”150 Iran 
has capitalized on the new Iraq to expand it influences. Developing joint oil fields, trade 
between Iran and Iraq now stands at nearly eight billion dollars per year. The competition 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia over Iraq continues to escalate, further destabilizing an 
already shaky and failing political state. 
The Nuclear Issue 
The development of a “Shi’ite bomb” may cause Saudi Arabia to develop its own 
nuclear program. On July 14, 2015, the United States along with world powers, the U.K, 
France, Russia, China and Germany negotiated a nuclear deal with Iran. This nuclear 
accord has been vociferously criticized by U.S. and Iranian hardliners, as well as among 
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regional allies in the region, such as Israel and many Arab countries.151 Saudi Arabia 
views this as the U.S. providing Iran’s nuclear program with its “stamp of approval.” As 
Iran’s main ideological and strategic rival, Saudi Arabia has announced its plan to build 
its own nuclear program with a minimum of 16 nuclear reactors as a way to bridge this 
gap.152 Saudi Arabia believes that it has the resources to purchase nuclear capabilities 
from an outside source. As Saudi Arabia has a history of acting clandestinely in the 
nuclear arena, the production of a Sunni bomb to counter the Shi’ite bomb remains a 
possibility. A nuclear Iran threatens the fragile stability of the global world by bringing 
nuclear proliferation to the Middle East.  
Since 2003, a salient political development in Iran has been the strengthening of 
conservative and hard-line tendencies in the government. This has been especially true 
after the election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad in 2005.153 While Iran’s nuclear program 
began in the 1970s under the era of the Shah, the issue of the nuclear program became 
salient under Ahmadinejad. Originally, the goal was to build 20 nuclear power reactors, 
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with research and development focusing on the conduction of fissile and material 
production. The Iranian Revolution, however, hindered these initial nuclear efforts.154  
For Iran, gaining a nuclear weapon is a nationalist issue. When Ahmadinejad 
came to power, he attempted to vitalize Khomeini’s ideological zeal. Benefitting greatly 
from the overthrow of Iraq and yet surrounded by enemies, Iran became determined to 
acquire all the technologies that would be acquired for a nuclear weapon. A nuclear 
weapons program would both act as a deterrent and also provide Iran with vast political, 
military and diplomatic power, not to mention prestige. While Iran claimed that its 
nuclear program was for purely peaceful purses, it continued to hide many of its nuclear 
activities from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), leading to the 
international arenas speculation that Iran was indeed intending to create a nuclear 
weapons program. Additionally, after months of extended negotiations with Europe, the 
Iranian government concluded that it would slowly resume the acceleration of its 
enrichment program. Each year, Iran implements another step of nuclear enrichment. For 
instance, by 2006, Iran was able to convert uranium ore into uranium gas whose purpose 
could be used in both nuclear reactors and weapons. By 2007, Iran announced that it 
would end its “voluntary” cooperation with the IAEA and begin the full production of 
enriched uranium. IAEA inspectors were no longer allowed to do voluntary inspections 
and furthermore, lost access to many sites. From what knowledge experts have been able to 
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accumulate, Iran’s nuclear stockpile includes 15 power reactors and two research reactors are 
under full construction.155 Iran, learning from the mistakes of its predecessors, including 
Iraq, dispersed these nuclear reactor programs all around the vast country, including to 
underground location in order to avoid detection 
In the nuclear age, nuclear weapons dominate strategy, specifically the diplomacy 
of violence. Although the world has been able enjoy an era of nuclear peace as a result of 
the military strategy of deterrence, unfortunately there are those who fear that new global 
developments are shifting the international system to experience state and non-state 
actors who challenge the assumptions of the deterrence theory. As nuclear proliferation 
occurs, the international system is once again experiencing nuclear states with radical 
revolutionary global objectives. These objectives will first threaten their regional enemies 
and thus, proliferation may come in hostile pairs, which can set off a chain reaction of 
other neighbors fearing for their existence or strategic power position in their region. 
With so many unstable forces dominating the current arena, the fear of nuclear war is 
becoming more realistic and more eminent. 
                                                
155  Bernard Gwertzman, "Cirincione: Iran’s New ‘Hard Line’ President Pushing Iran toward Security 
Council Action on Nuclear Issues." Council on Foreign Relations. January 5, 2006. Accessed July 8, 2015. 
http://www.cfr.org/iran/cirincione-irans-new-hard-line-president-pushing- 
iran-toward-security-council-action-nuclear-issues/p9495.  
 
 95 
 
 
 
It has been proclaimed that “nuclear proliferation is inevitable, at best it can be 
managed, not prevented.”156 One nation of serious concern to the security of the global 
world is Iran. Not even at its core did the Cold War have an age-old enmity such as the 
Sunni-Shi’ite and Arab-Iranian conflict. An Iranian bomb would be perceived in the Arab 
world as an Iranian (anti-Arab) and Shi’ite (anti-Sunni) capability. During the Cold War, 
just the ideological threat led each nation to believe that an improvement in the defense 
system was essential in order to meet the requirements of deterrence. As a direct result, 
each nation acquired a multitude of nuclear weapons that had the potential to bring the 
world to thermonuclear war and utter destruction. If the technology to create nuclear 
weapons fell into the hands of such powerful enemies, such as the Sunni and Shi’ite 
Muslims, it would offset and destroy the strategic balance of the Middle East and lead to 
catastrophic results. The power vacuum left in the failed state of Iraq and Iran’s nuclear 
weapons program has magnified the danger of the fissure, as an Iranian bomb would be 
perceived as an Iranian and Shi’ite capability. 
Iran is concerned with gaining security for the regime and strengthening its 
prestige in the Middle East. The acquisition of an Iranian bomb would redress and 
reverse the strategic imbalance of the Middle East and guarantee Iran regional 
dominance. The Cold War proved that superpowers are hesitant to use military tactics to 
challenge national policies of nations with nuclear powers, in fear that results would end 
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in a nuclear holocaust. Iran hopes to gain a nuclear weapon with the deterrence strategy 
in mind as played out during the Cold War. Superpowers will not risk war with a state 
with nuclear weapons. Furthermore, if the Iranian bomb does develop, Iran’s funding to 
extreme terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, and Hamas will not be able to be controlled 
by sanctions invoked by other nations. Currently, the Shi’ites hope to unite the Sunnis in 
their cause against the ultimate enemy, the West. 
The fear is that if the Iranian Shi’ites succeed in developing the bomb, it will 
completely usurp the balance between the Gulf States. Nuclear non-proliferation has been 
for years a major goal of Middle East politics. In the 1970’s, Saudi Arabia immediately 
opted for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East, as paralleled by other Arab gulf 
countries and Persian Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran are both members of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Due to its alliance with the United States, Saudi Arabia is 
held under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. According to former Secretary Hillary Clinton at 
the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, “The United States and Saudi Arabia... face a 
common enemy [Iran]...cooperation is essential to keeping both of our countries safe...the 
United States would pledge to defend its friends and allies in the region from Iranian 
aggression.157 The 2013 United States Central Command (CENTCOM) statement also 
supports this posture,  
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For decades, security cooperation has been a cornerstone of our relationship with 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As we face sophisticated regional challenges in the 
Middle East, helping to enable the upgrade of Saudi Arabia’s defense 
capabilities…helps the Kingdom prepare to meet regional threats.158 
Despite these claims of assurance, when Iraq was invaded by the United States 
and dismantled, Iran took the opportunity to attain its national goal of nuclear 
proliferation. Experts have maintained that if Iran were to acquire such nuclear weapons, 
it is inevitable that Saudi Arabia might initiate or revive their own nuclear weapons 
program.159 Saudi Arabia worries that it will become a pawn in Iran’s game to become 
the sovereign nation in the Islamic World. Regional hegemony and Islamic leadership 
would finally provide Iran with an unprecedented power that other leading nations would 
be hesitant to provoke. Rival state, Saudi Arabia, is not concerned that Iran is going to 
use the bomb against them, or even that Iran will use the bomb to attack the United States 
or Israel. The theory of deterrence is still upheld. Rather, Saudi Arabia (and other 
powerful Sunni nations) will not tolerate the political, military, and diplomatic power that 
a nuclear Iran would posses. The growing threat of Iran’s proliferation, coupled with 
Ahmadinejad's increasingly antagonistic public rhetoric and foreign policy actions, has 
forced Saudi Arabia’s governing system to reevaluate its strategic positioning in the 
Middle East and explore its own nuclear options. In an interview between Hillary Clinton 
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and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, when asked what measures can be 
taken to establish an international stand against Iran in the event that an announcement 
threatening the economical interests of oil-exporting countries, Saud al-Faisal responded, 
If this is true, this is considered an act of war – this announcement will be 
received as an act of war and this...would be threatening [to] the international 
peace and security and [will be received as] hazardous action.. taken by the Iran 
authority. We hope that this announcement [is] false, but if it is true, it would be 
very hazardous and threatening.160  
The implications of Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal’s claim is that in such a case, 
despite any pacts that the United States and Saudi Arabia might have, national and 
territorial security is prioritized. The Iranian nuclear program is “terrifying” to the 
Saudis.161 Based on the Saudi’s reactions, the real concern is that Saudi Arabia might take 
a nuclear “shortcut.” Ever since 1988, it has been known that Saudi Arabia has purchased 
and made agreements with nuclear countries such as China, Pakistan, and even Brazil 
(when Brazil was pursuing nuclear proliferation). In 1988, Saudi Arabia purchased from 
China 36 DF-3 (CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Both countries denied that 
these weapons were equipped with nuclear warheads and insisted that not only were they 
equipped with conventional warheads, but also that many of the missiles remain at the 
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Chinese Military bases.162 There are theories indicating that Saudi Arabia has a secret 
agreement with Pakistan regarding Nuclear weapons.163 Pakistani experts are believed to 
be providing Saudi Arabian scientists with nuclear intelligence. It is argued that in 
consideration of a nuclear option, Saudi Arabia would either purchase nuclear weapons 
as David Albright stipulates that the Saudis “would be the first of the world’s…nuclear 
powers to have bought rather than built the bomb.” There are also theories that Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan have an agreement that if Saudi Arabia deems it necessary to acquire 
nuclear weapons, then Pakistan will protect Saudi Arabia and base nuclear weapons on 
Saudi land, a caveat that would actually be considered legal under the NPT. This is all 
plausible as Saudi Arabia funded the Pakistani nuclear program.  
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have always had strong bilateral relations, which, in 
the last few decades, have exponentially strengthened. As a result of Iran's nuclear 
weapons program and its refusal to abide by the IAEA's demands, Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia understand that the world will once again see the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Following the logic of Pakistan's past offer of protection during the early 
1990's, it is evident that in the case that an Iranian bomb does develop, Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia will also have arranged a program for nuclear weapons cooperation. Saudi 
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Arabia, for the first time in the history of nuclear proliferation, will most likely purchase 
the bomb. In addition, Pakistan will probably base missiles on Saudi land in order to offer 
nuclear protection. In the German magazine, Cicero, further analysis of this secret 
nuclear program is provided. The magazine states that between October of 2004 and 
January 2005, Pakistani scientists came to Saudi-Arabia under the guise of pilgrims. 
According the security expert Udo Ulfkotte, some of the scientists sporadically left their 
hotel rooms, occasionally for periods of three weeks. The most pointing evidence of the 
reality of a secret nuclear program lies in the fact that half of Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
have Saudi barcodes on them, as John Pike, US military analyst explains that, "Saudi 
Arabia...co-financed the Pakistani atomic nuclear programme."164 The magazine also said 
that dozens of underground silos were found by satellite images, proving that Saudi 
Arabia is preparing to house long-range missiles, specifically of Pakistan origins. 
When the United States was confronted with allegations of Saudi's potential 
nuclear proliferation with the help of Pakistan experts, they immediately denied them and 
explained that Saudi Arabia signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
that Pakistan is in agreement with their concerns regarding proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. As President Barak Obama’s nonproliferation adviser, Gary Samore states, “ I 
do not think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, 
in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan." 
Unfortunately, the NPT has major holes in it. It is vital to understand that when it comes 
                                                
164 “Saudi Arabia Pursuing Secret Nuclear Program,”Cicero-Magazin Fur Politische Kultur. 
 101 
 
 
 
down to regional security, despite ties with the United States, Saudi Arabia is going to 
attempt every avenue it has to ensure that it will be able to deter Iran if/when the Shiite 
bomb is developed. 165 
This pattern of thinking dominates the majority of Middle Eastern country's 
policies regarding nuclear proliferation. Despite whether or not Saudi Arabia is seeking 
nuclear proliferation, based on its military spending, it is evident that it is incredibly 
concerned with national security and is seeking to strengthen its conventional army. 
According to a U.S. Congressional research service report, in 2008 Saudi Arabia spent 
8.7 billion dollars on an arms-transfer agreement. In 2009, Saudi Arabia received the first 
72 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, and increased an order for Airbus A330 MRTT 
tanker/transport from two to six. Furthermore, according to Military Technology’s 
consensus report, there is a clear trend in the increase of missile defense illustrating Saudi 
Arabia’s need to promote deterrence in the Middle East against the overwhelming threat 
of an Iranian bomb. Billion dollar deals with Russia have also been noted, following this 
same pattern of missile defense with the purchase of S-300- the same defense weaponry 
previously purchased by Iran. Saudi Arabia is an incredibly significant case as the 
country is a rich and powerful nation that although continues to maintain close relations 
with the United States, will engage in relations and activities independent of U.S. 
involvement to ensure national security. Thus the arms race mentality that dominated 
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much of the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union is once again 
becoming between rival powers Saudi Arabia and Iran in a turbulent region that is 
dominated by unstable authoritarian governments and fanatical religious non-state actors.  
Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Yemen 
Traditionally, the most important arena of conflict between rivals Saudi Arabia 
and Iran has been the Gulf. While Saudi Arabia does maintain a high level of political 
influence with local Gulf monarchies, Iran seeks to mobilize with local Arab Shi’ite 
communities as a means to leverage pressure on the Gulf governments on issues 
important to Iran. For Saudi Arabia, its bordering neighbor, Yemen, has been a state 
where Saudi Arabia has actively sought influence. Saudi Arabia and Yemen share a 700- 
mile border that is highly penetrable and often used by criminals, smugglers, terrorists 
and insurgents.166 To ensure its authority, Saudi Arabia has contributed numerous funds 
to boost the Yemeni economy and has provided a multitude of financial resources during 
times of political upheaval.167  Saudi Arabia and Iran have brought their differences to the 
turf of the Yemeni conflict between Yemen’s Houthis minority and the Yemeni 
government. 
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The Houthis movement merged out of a group known as the Believing Youth, a 
moderate theological movement founded in the year 1992.168 According to Ahmed 
Addaghasi, this movement was a religious group affiliated with the Zaydi sect of Shi’ite 
Islam, that originally held a broad-minded cultural and educational vision. Based in the 
Northern province of Sa’ada, the group eventually split, with one side becoming 
radicalized after the 2003 Iraqi invasion, chanting anti-Western and later, anti-
government slogans. In 2004, the movement turned to arms and the first war with the 
government erupted. President Ali Abdullah Saleh saw the Houthis rebel group, officially 
known as Ansarallah (partisans of God), as a challenge to his rule, arresting group 
members and demanding a cease to their worshipping and protesting in mosques in the 
capital. The war lasted for six years until it ended in a ceasefire agreement in 2010.169  
Saudi Arabia, highly suspicious of Iran’s motives in the region and domination 
over the Shi’ite Crescent (the crescent-shaped region of the Middle East where the 
majority population is Shi’ite or where there is a strong Shi’ite minority), has been 
especially protective of Yemen. Both Saudi Arabia and Yemen have accused Iran of 
backing the Houthis rebels, a Shi’ite group belonging to the Fiver Shi’ite sect. The 
Iranian leadership has supported the Houthis rhetorically, advocating religious solidarity. 
As this is an issue that is greatly important to the Shi’ite community, many observers 
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claim that Iran is supporting the Houthis with funding, training and material aid. These 
claims are further backed by the fact that the BY summer camps attended by the now 
Houthis faction, included lectures by Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of 
Hezbollah.170 Saudi Arabia grew increasingly worried, as it seemed like Houthi 
leadership sought to move its organization to an even more radicalized form of Shi’ite 
Islam, modeled after the Iranian approach to religion.171 
By 2009, the Yemeni government’s conflict with its Shi’ite took a turn for the 
worse when Saudi Arabia militarily intervened in northern Yemen. By November 2009, 
Saudi’s borders with Yemen infiltrated Saudi villages.172 With permission from the 
Sana’a government, in its largest military engagement since the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi 
Arabia intervened, using heavy artillery and airpower, in order to destroy large elements 
of the Houthis forces. The strategic plan was to then defeat the residual military forces. In 
response, Iran increased its assistance to the Houthis rebel forces and Hezbollah was sent 
to train Houthis forces. The war ended in February 2010 when the Houthis withdrew 
from Saudi territory and a cease-fire was established. While this conflict may not have 
been covered, it is important for this thesis to consider as not only does it carry grave 
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risks for Yemen’s political and sectarian stasis, but it shows Saudi Arabia and Iran’s 
willingness to directly become engaged in civil conflicts within the region as a means to 
foster their influence.  
Saudi Iranian Rivalry in Palestinian Territories 
A regional issue that is important to explore in regards to Saudi-Iranian 
competition for influence is the Palestinian issue. For many Muslims, the 1967 Six Day 
War, fought between Israel and the neighboring states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, was a 
war that established Israel as the dominant regional military power. This was perceived as 
a great defeat and as a result, religious revivalism and retrenchment spread throughout 
much of the Muslim world. This religious revival affected all aspects of public life and 
popularized notions of political Islam.173 The Palestinian national movement emerged as 
a major actor after 1967 as both political and military organizations that made up the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization and later Hamas, the militant and internationally 
recognized terrorist organization. Thus, as Saudi Arabia and Iran both contend to be the 
true protectors of Islam, they have actively championed and supported Palestinian 
national rights and are sharp critics of Israel. Both hold different views of the Peace 
Process, however.  
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While Saudi Arabia has been known to support Palestinian terrorism, they also 
have shown somewhat of a moderate perspective regarding the Arab-Israeli peace 
process. For instance, in a 2002 Beirut summit conference, Saudi Arabia proposed a 
peace plan that offers comprehensive recognition of Israel by all Arab league states in 
exchange for the territories conquered in the 1967 war.174 Saudi Arabia’s purposes do not 
necessarily pertain to progress regarding the peace process. Rather, Saudi leaders fear 
that the lack of peace will enhance Iran’s power at the expense of their own.  Saudi 
Arabia maintains stable and normal relations with both Palestinian groups, Fatah and 
Hamas. Saudi Arabia has made many efforts to support the Palestinians, by providing 
both financial resources and political influence on their behalf. Saudi Arabia has 
contributed significant donations directly to Palestinian organizations and causes, most of 
which has been provided to the West Bank government, Fatah. During the early 2000s, 
Saudi Arabia also heavily financed Hamas, with funds estimated to be around half of the 
Hamas operating budget.175 Since then however, sources show that while Saudi private 
money flowing to Hamas has diminished when Hamas leaned more heavily on Iran. 
Additionally, since Hamas has shifted to Iran, the Saudi government has been more vocal 
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of condemning Hamas while making sure to emphasize that Israeli actions are acts of 
genocide against the Palestinian people.176 
Iran, on the other hand, since the 1979 Revolution has presented itself as 
completely opposing any type of peace plan and instead portrays itself as the “leading 
military power supporting Palestinian Rights and opposing Israel, through a variety of 
means, including supplying weapons and funding to Palestinian Islamic militants.”177 
Iran's support of the Palestinians has actually been fundamental to its regional ambitions 
as it has consolidated support for the regime internally and also has vastly elevated its 
role and status in the region. Iran’s support of Hamas has been so substantial that Hamas 
is often considered to be a proxy of Iran. Fatah leaders have many times stated that Iran is 
using Hamas to impose its own agenda on the Palestinian people. This alliance with 
Hamas is a key aspect of Iran’s strategy in the Levant. Iran’s connection to the Sunni 
organization has brought it closer to fermenting the seeds of the Islamic revolution and 
uniting all Islam under a single creed, Khomeinism. Since the early 2000s, Iran has 
smuggled a massive amount of weapons into Gaza through tunnels from Egypt. Experts 
have been able to identify that many of these weapons and explosive originate from the 
Iranians. 178  
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Saudi-Iranian Rivalry in Lebanon  
The Saudi-Iranian contestation for land, resources, weapons and influence in the 
Levant is also widely present in Lebanon. From 1975 until the early 1990s Lebanon was 
engaged in a brutal civil war. For centuries Lebanon had acted as a refuge for the region’s 
minorities, leaving it a multifaceted ethnic and religious state priding itself on being a 
land of liberty, tolerance and culture whose main population groups included Sunni 
Muslims, Shi’ite Muslims, Druze and Christians. When the civil war ended, Lebanon 
became a weak state influenced by both external actors and regional actors, such as Syria, 
Iran, the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. 
When considering the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in Lebanon, it is evident that Iran has 
important ties to the Lebanese political organization, Hezbollah, which has provided Iran 
with a superior ability to influence politics in the country. Founded during the Lebanese 
civil war, Hezbollah has become one of the most powerful political organizations in 
Lebanese affairs. Hezbollah has often been described as a “state within the state,” as it 
manages an extensive security (military arm) apparatus, political organization and social 
service networks in Lebanon as a means to resist Israeli and Western involvement in the 
Middle East.179 Hezbollah is widely recognized as a global terrorist threat and perilous to 
stability in the Middle East. Hezbollah has been led by Hassan Nasrallah since 1992 and 
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operates an extensive welfare and education network for Lebanese Shi’ites, who in turn 
are expected to provide the organization both loyalty and support. Hezbollah has 
consistently maintained representative in the Lebanese parliament and cabinet. Iran has 
been one of Hezbollah’s largest supporters, making Hezbollah an effective proxy for 
Iranian foreign policy. Iran’s influence is maintained through generous financial and 
material aid, funneled into Lebanon via Syria.180 Iran provides Hezbollah with tens of 
thousands of rockets, millions of dollars a year-annual $200 million-in addition to 
training and logistical support.181 Iran has also given Hezbollah Scud, tactical ballistic 
missiles, with up to 10 SCUD-D (long range) missiles.182 Hezbollah’s founding 
manifesto vowed its loyalty to Iran’s supreme leader, called for the expulsion of the 
United States, France and Israel from Lebanese territory and for the destruction of the 
Israeli state.183 Iran has greatly profited from the growing power of Hezbollah, especially 
after its apparent success in defending itself against Israel. Thus, as Hezbollah conducts 
operations around the world at Iran’s command, Iran gets, “an extended reach-to the 
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Mediterranean and beyond-and a means of targeting its enemies from afar with 
reasonable deniability.”184 
 Saudi Arabia has viewed Lebanon as an important base long before its rivalry 
with Iran. Even prior to the Lebanese Civil War, Saudi Arabia attempted to influence 
Lebanese politics yet kept a low profile due to Abdel Nasser’s popularity in the country. 
Saudi Arabia first accessed Lebanese politics via its press. The Al-Hayat newspaper 
became a main instrument for Saudi’s propaganda. Additionally, Lebanon's prime 
minister during this time period, Hajj Hussein al-U’wani, made his fortune in Saudi 
Arabia and even became a quasi-official Saudi political representative in Lebanon.  
Based on religion and petrodollars, Saudi Arabia saw the Civil War in Lebanon as 
a mean to pursue their campaign to spread the Wahhabi doctrine, promote Arabism, and 
Islamicize Lebanon in the Middle East, particularly on behalf of the Sunni population.185 
In fact, it was Saudi Arabia’s influence that finally brought an end to the 15-year long 
civil war. Negotiate in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia assisted in the mediation of the 
agreement and designed the agreement to politically accommodate the demographic shift 
to a Muslim majority and reinforced Lebanese authority in the South, which has been 
occupied by Israel since the early 1980’s. Saudi Arabia became heavily involved in 
Lebanese politics following the 1989 Taif Agreement. Saudi Arabia contributed vast 
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funds to help with Lebanese reconstruction. Saudi Arabia’s influence became even more 
substantial when Rafiq al-Harir, a dual citizen of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia became the 
acting Prime Minister of Lebanon. Rafiq al-Hariri made a great fortune in Saudi Arabia 
and when during his time as the Lebanese Prime Minister (1992-1998; 2000-2004), he 
was a great friend to Saudi Arabia. As Hariri dominated the country’s post war political 
and business life, Saudi Arabia received the opportunity to play a major role in 
Lebanon’s economic rebuilding. When viewing the Saudi relationship with Hariri, many 
observers claim that Hariri represented Saudi interests in Lebanon. Hariri became on of 
the most prominent Sunni politicians in the Middle East until his assassination in 2005. 
Syria and its powerful Shi’ite ally, Hezbollah (and thus an extension of Iran) have been 
prominently accused of being behind Hariri’s murder and his death has served to 
heighten the country’s sectarian divisions and the role of external powers, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia.  
The 2006 summer military intervention in Lebanon by the Israeli Defense Forces 
marked a turning point in Lebanese politics. Israel’s war in Lebanon was launched as a 
response to Hezbollah's continuous attacks and kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. Widely 
viewed as a failure, the second Lebanon War did not meet its obejctives and instead 
served to elevate Hezbollah’s status in the country, and as an extension, tipped in the 
balance in favor of Iranian influence. Attempting to counterbalance Iran’s activities in 
Lebanese politics, Saudi Arabia constantly condemned Hezbollah, and therefore Iran’s, 
role in instigating the war and blamed Hezbollah’s leader for all the Lebanese deaths and 
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massive damage to Lebanese civilian infrastructure and economy.186 Saudi attempts to 
condemn Hezbollah backfired, however, as many Arabs around the world lauded 
Hezbollah’s efforts, viewing their success as a symbol of success for all Arabs.187 
Following the 2006 War, Saudi Arabia has invested even more funds to Sunni and 
Christian communities as an attempt to reinforce their importance in Lebanese politics. 
Saudi Arabia has providing financial backing for the construction of 55, 000 residential 
units and to once again assist in post war reconstruction civilian infrastructure. As 
Hezbollah gained further prominence in Lebanese politics, Sunni and Shi’ite faction 
movements began emphasizing their pro-Saudi stance in lieu of falling under an Iranian 
satellite.188 Thus, Lebanon is an important case to consider as the conflict between 
regional powers Saudi Arabia and Iran has been exported to Lebanese politics. The two 
states’ support rival factions as a means to increase their own influence in the Levant has 
only served to increase political, sectarian and security turmoil in Lebanon. 
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Conclusion  
Saudi Arabia and Iran are key players in the region. In their quest to control 
different parts of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran have divided the region into two 
armed camps on the basis of political ideology. The 2003 U.S. led invasion of Iraq, the 
disposition  of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent de-baathification policies, has shifted 
the balance of power between rival states Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iraq, for centuries a 
major Sunni power in the Middle East, became a regime governed exclusively by its 
Shi’ite majority, creating the first Arab Shi’ite state. In shaping their domestic and 
foreign policies, Saudi Arabia and Iran have used sectarianism as a form of ethno-
religious political mobilization. The chaos and conflict in Iraq has reverted Iraqis back to 
their most basic sectarian identity, an identity that Saudi Arabia and Iran have exploited 
in their political rivalry,  
 Saudi Arabia’s worries regarding Iran’s asymmetric power and regional ambitions 
have been further increased as during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency and the 
renewed development to create a “Shi’ite bomb.” Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon may 
cause Saudi Arabia to develop its own nuclear program, instigating proliferation and the 
next arms race in the Middle East. As Saudi Arabia has a history of acting clandestinely 
in the nuclear arena, the production of a Sunni bomb to counter the Shi’ite bomb remains 
a possibility, further derailing stability and security in the Middle East.  
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 The events leading up to 2011 have further encouraged the two nations to support 
their proxies through funding, military arms, soldiers, and by encouraging sectarianism. 
Saudi-Iranian proxy wars have grown more significant in the period post 2003, as Saudi 
Arabia and Iran have engaged in a series of proxy wars, both hot and cold, in the Middle 
East and have played an increased role in the civil conflicts within the region. Iran 
supports Hezbollah in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia has also competed for influence in 
Lebanon, supporting Sunni and Christian movements. Saudi Arabia and Iran have also 
supported rival factions in the Palestinian cause for self-determination. Additionally, in 
order to counter Iran’s expanding geopolitical footprint and contain it from completing 
influence within “Shi’ite Crescent” Saudi Arabia has been willing to militarily intervene 
in another country’s conflict as seen in the Yemeni government’s fight against the Iranian 
backed Houthi rebels. These proxy wars have escalated conflicts within the region, 
heighten mutual fears, and severely disrupt regional stability. Rival countries Saudi 
Arabia and Iran have exported their tensions to all corners of the region. The Arab Spring 
in 2011 has escalated the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, further derailing the fragile stability and 
security of the region.  
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Chapter Six: Saudi-Iranian Relations in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings 
2011-Present  
 
Beginning in the winter of 2011, a series of cascading events shook the Arab 
world. Amidst the political upheaval of the Arab Spring that overturned status quos, also 
known as the Arab Uprisings, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry once again began to manifest 
itself in the domestic conflicts that shaped the region. In their competition for hegemony, 
these ideological and political rivals have now, more than ever, exploited conflicts in the 
region, from the Levant to the Gulf, supporting opposing political parties, funding rival 
armies and waging military action against the other’s proxies in Bahrain, Syria, Iraq and 
Yemen. The historical events of 2011 have further exacerbated hostilities between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, drawing upon each affront committed by the other as justification for 
their current foreign policy actions and positions. This section will serve to explore how 
the 2011 Arab Uprisings have further intensified the struggle between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran.  
The Arab Uprisings 
On the 17th of December in the year 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian 
citizen, set himself on fire in front of the local municipality in protest of the confiscation 
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of his vegetable cart and its contents; his actions that day ignited the Tunisian Revolution 
and the larger Arab Uprisings. Mohammed Bouazizi was a 26-year-old, educated 
Tunisian street vendor in the city of Sidi Bouzid, whose family depended on the income 
that he received from selling vegetables. On the 17th, a municipal officer humiliated 
Bouazizi and confiscated his cart and goods. When he went to the provincial 
headquarters, a beautiful and elegant white building, to protest the continued targeting 
and harassment that he and many other Tunisians experienced by the local police, the 
government refused to see or listen to him.  
Bouazizi’s ordeal and protests against the Tunisian government inspired 
demonstrations all throughout Tunisia and other Arab countries. His actions eventually 
brought about the end of Ben Ali’s rule of Tunisia and of Mubarak’s 28-year rule of 
Egypt, contribution to “historic changes in the Arab World.”  In analyzing the contagion 
of human right struggles throughout the region of the Middle East and North Africa, a 
variety of key common elements can be seen. Causes such as the deepening legitimacy 
issues of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, global economic growth that in 
turn raised the global middle class, increased education and individual living standards, 
and gender restrictions were instrumental catalysts in the spread of human rights. 
                Specifically, as seen via the very symbolic act of Bouazizi’s self immolation, 
many individuals in the Middle East and North Africa region suffer from severe social, 
political and economic grievances. As the population continues to increase, and as the 
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percentage of individuals under 30 begins to overwhelm, the aging authoritarian regimes 
are simply unable to meet the political and economic demands of this immense growth. 
In essence, the authoritarian regimes were unable to provide the basic needs of human 
welfare to their populations. A culmination of high unemployment, inflation of food 
prices, unfettered corruption, political restrictions, etc., led to the wave of social and 
political protests that shook the Arab world.189 Although the majority of individuals were 
experiencing the same human rights struggles, the true mobilizing force was the unifying 
message sent by neighboring countries.  
The 2011 pro-democracy and anti-regime protests known as the “Arab Uprisings” 
have brought down regimes in the Arab countries of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen 
and have sparked mass protests and uprisings in many other countries across the Arab 
world ranging everywhere from Morocco, Algeria to the Palestinian territories, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.190 
Although it was clear that Arab regimes were deeply unpopular and faced serious social, 
political and economic issues, the upheavals came as a shock and surprise to many 
academic experts of the Middle East and North African region and to many of the 
region’s regime leaders. Unfortunately, the promises of the Arab Uprisings continue to 
remain elusive. While there were some successes, the Uprisings led to the toppling and 
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transformation of existing power structures that increased interstate aggression, 
threatening the socio-political and economic security of multiple states,  
The Arab uprisings have unleashed internal dynamics of protest and political 
change in most of the states of the region, its impact transcending national 
systems, and affecting the political order in the Arab world. The region is at a 
crossroads…191 
 
As the Arab Uprisings continue to transform the balance of power, states are not 
becoming stronger as originally hoped, but rather are becoming weak and fragile, 
creating opportunities for different actors with wide ramifications concerning regional 
and international security.192  
A New Dynamic? 
 The Arab Spring has introduced new political variables that Saudi Arabia and Iran 
must consider when pursuing their foreign policy regional priorities. When the Arab 
Uprisings moved from Tunisia to Egypt, both states took an invested interest in the 
outcome of the struggle. What is most interesting when considering the post Arab 
Uprisings is that the Saudi’s appeal to maintain the status quo and Iran’s quest to spread 
its Islamic revolutionary message have become somewhat adjusted.193 For instance, while 
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Saudi Arabia watched the toppling of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and 
around the region with acute horror, Iranian leadership viewed the events with 
enthusiasm, seeing the spread of its own revolutionary message come to fruition, calling 
the political upheaval as a defeat for the U.S. and a “liberating Islamic movement” part of 
an “Islamic awakening” in the Middle East, except in Syria.194 While this thesis will 
explore the case of Syria in depth later in the chapter, Syria is not only Iran’s closest Arab 
ally in the region but also provides Iran with access to its most important proxy, 
Hezbollah. As such, when the Arab Uprisings occurred in Syria, Iran did not support the 
civil resistance or the rebel groups, but rather has stood by its ally and has contributed 
funds, weapons and personnel to support the Assad regime in its fight to maintain power. 
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, while terrified when Mubarak fell, has been a main 
supporter of the Sunni rebel groups in their fight to overthrow Syrian President Assad.195    
These new concerns became synonymous with the uprisings that spread 
throughout the region, with both nations contributing efforts and resources to improve 
relations with the newly transitioning leadership. Moreover, as Saudi Arabia and Iran 
seek to uphold their spheres of influence in the Gulf and the Levant, the two enemies 
have taken advantage of security vacuums in weak states as a means to cultivate 
influence in the failing countries’ domestic politics. Now, not only have Saudi Arabia and 
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Iran engaged in proxy wars against each other, but within the context of the Arab 
Uprisings, the rivalry between the two states has also resulted in direct military 
interventions in Bahrain, Yemen, Syria and Iraq. 
Dividing the Protestors: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Bahraini Uprisings 
 
On February 14, 2011, influenced by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, 
opposition movements within Bahrain began calling for constitutional reforms, free 
elections, and the release of prisoners of conscience from the firmly established Khalifa 
monarchy. Bahrain is a country of 1.3 million people, and although the Shi’ite Muslims 
constitute 70% of the population, political power remains in the hands of the Sunni 
minority. Though the demonstrations were originally limited to Bahraini youth within the 
Shi’ite majority, the movement expanded following violent government repression to 
include doctors, teachers, laborers, union workers, journalists, lawyers, and other 
workers. At the peak of the uprising, up to 200,000 people (25% of the adult population) 
participated. The movement, which had successfully engaged a large portion of the 
Shi’ite population, did not reach wider segments of Bahraini society. Recent tactics have 
been limited to marches and protests, some of which have become violent, due in large 
part to a lack of internal organization. Bahrain represents the first country to deploy Gulf 
Cooperation Council forces to assist its own internal security forces in the violent 
repression against the resistance movement. To date, eighty-nine resistance members 
have been killed and several thousand injuries have been suffered by both sides of the 
uprising. When examining the protest movements in the Gulf, regional players have 
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played on and strengthened sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims in 
order to weaken the “cross-sectarian opposition front” that presented itself during the 
formative days of the Bahraini uprising. As Toby Matthiesen explains,  
The sectarian Gulf was encouraged by sectarian identity entrepreneurs...a close 
look at their role indicates that sectarianism was not just a government invention 
but the result of an amalgam of political, religious, social, and economic elites 
who all used sectarianism to further their personal aims.196 
 
 Bahrain is a country that is of interest to both Saudi Arabia and Iran. To begin 
with, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are both Sunni monarchies and both are members of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. In fact, Al Khalifa and many Bahraini Sunni families trace 
their tribal origins back to the Najd.197 Bahrain and Saudi Arabia share close proximity to 
one another and are connected by a 16-mile causeway. Saudi Arabia’s political leverage 
is also tied to its financial aid contributions to Bahrain. Bahrain’s main oil revenue is 
derived from Saudi Arabia as Bahrain and the Saudi Kingdom share the Abu Safa 
offshore field, making the Bahraini economy and state budget largely dependent on Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s support is widely welcomed by the Khalifa monarchy.  
Iran’s intentions towards Bahrain are long standing and date back to the Shah. 
Bahraini independence has always been a contentious issue for Iranian leadership as Iran 
maintains historical claims to Bahrain and in the 1970’s even announced its intent to 
reunite Bahrain with what it claims to be its “Iranian homeland.” This claim was further 
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reasserted when Khomeini came to power. Additionally, as the pivot of Shi’ite Muslims, 
Bahrain’s majority Shi’ite population (a portion of which are actually of Persian descent) 
remains of great interest to Iran. If Iran were to empower the Shi’ite sect to dominate 
society and politics, Iran would be able to gain a strategically positioned island. Iran 
would be in a position to have a commanding presence over the Arabian Gulf and also be 
provided with opportunities to threaten the oil shipment of other rich oil states.198 
 When the 2011 Uprisings occurred, given the Bahraini demographic, it is not 
surprising that the majority of the protestors were Shi’ite. Thus, as a result, archrival 
Shi’ite Iran was viewed as an instigator of the uprisings, with Bahraini and Saudi leaders 
attacking the state for planning the coup attempt. Iran, however, denied these claims with 
Ayatollah Khamenei, thus far only condemning the government of Bahrain's severe 
attack against its citizens, “I tell them we were involved in the anti-Israel activities...we 
are not afraid of saying this… that Iran interferes in [Bahrain’s] internal affairs; this is a 
lie. If we had interfered, the conditions would have been different.”199 While Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain’s Sunni leaders remain deeply concerned about Iran’s history of 
interference in Bahrain and believe that Iran and their Hezbollah agents continue to have 
design for sovereignty, experts on the subject doubt the ability of Iranians to influence 
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Bahrain’s Shi’ite communities given that Bahrain’s Shi’ite clergy maintains a quietist 
stance. For instance, some of the largest Shi’ite opposition groups in Bahrain, such as the 
al-Wiqaf, rejected all accusations of foreign ties and organized their protest so that they 
did not appear to be instrumentalized by foreign Shi’ite actors, namely Iran.200 
Nevertheless, there were factions within the Shi’ite political opposition groups that did 
maintain public displays and encouragement of foreign influence. The shirazi movement, 
led by al-Mudarassi, an individual of Iraqi-Iranian descent, publicly announced on 
satellite television his condemnation of the ruling family and of Saudi Arabia. Some of 
the youth protestors also claimed ties to the “Hezbollah” movement, a political Shi’ite 
Islamic movement who follow Khomeini. They believe that their spiritual leader is the 
Ayatollah Khameini, and that they stand in line with the doctrines advocated by the 
Ayatollah Khomeini, that society should be led by clerics and that they should adhere to 
the vilyat al-faqih. The existence of these groups leads credence to the fact that there 
could be a hint of involvement from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah.201  
Saudi Arabia, fearing that the Bahraini uprising would influence its own Shi’ite 
population to rebel, took a vested interest in supporting the Al Khalifa family in their 
crackdown against the uprising. When the protests took on an anti regime stance and as 
the crisis escalated, Bahrain invoked a GCC security clause that called for assistance. 
Saudi Arabia sent in 1000 troops to help the Bahraini government suppress the protests 
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and invoked a brutal crackdown. The presence of Saudi Arabia’s troops acted as a means 
to prevent the Shi’ite of Bahrain from gaining more power and to prevent their future 
collaboration with Iranian military and intelligence.202 Iran, in response, condemned the 
crackdown and summoned the Bahraini ambassador in Tehran as a sign of official 
protest.  When the inter-sectarian protests began to take a more Shi’ite dominated, anti-
regime message, many Sunnis withdrew their support from the cause. Coupled with 
Saudi Arabia's arrival, the regime media took advantage of the increasingly sectarian 
nature of the protests and attacked the Shi’ite protesters, accusing them of being pawns in 
an Iranian plot. The politicization of Sunni and Shi’ite divides made it even more socially 
acceptable to “hate the other.”203 For a while, the King even halted Bahrain airlines to 
Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon in an attempt to distance Shi’ite populations from one another. 
This presentation of a Sunni-Shi’ite struggle for dominance has internationalized the 
battle between regional players, bringing in Saudi support via military intervention and 
the politically motivated statements of Shi’ite leaders, primarily Iranian leaders. Thus, the 
conflict in Bahrain became an interplay of both bottom-up processes that divided the 
Bahrain movement, as well as important top-down processes that made Bahrain a proxy 
conflict instead of an adherence to the legitimate demands of Gulf citizens.  
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The Saudi-Iranian Battle in Syria 
In examining the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war lies at the 
heart of Saudi Arabia and Iran’s contention regarding the future of the Middle East. In 
March of 2011, the Arab uprisings found a voice among the Syrian people. For decades, 
Syrians have been suffering from severe political and economic grievances and were 
subjected to massive government corruptions and human rights abuses under the Bashar 
al-Assad Regime. Fighting for political freedom, social justice and dignity, the 
demonstration movement originally took on civil and non-violent approach. Thousands 
took to the streets in the cities of Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. By April of 2011, 
however, the situation had escalated and Assad began a massive campaign to remove the 
anti-regime oppositional forces. He deployed the widely feared Shabiha militia and 
police troops to enforce a vicious onslaught against the Syrian protestors that ultimately 
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Syrians and the wounding of thousands. By July of 
2011, a rebel group, formed out of defected military personnel, created the Free Syrian 
Army, in order to establish a formal military opposition group to the Assad regime. By 
2015, the Syrian Uprising has turned into a bloody and divisive sectarian civil war that 
has resulted in more than 160,000 deaths, 6.5 million internally displaced persons and 2.7 
million refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon.204 Furthermore, the 
fractionalization created room for the emergence of ISIS in Syria. Due to these intractable 
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circumstances, it has become widely forgotten that the Syrian Uprising was born out of 
the desire to replace the Assad regime with a “free, democratic state in a sovereign, 
independent Syria.”205 
 Taking over for his father in 2000, Bashar al-Assad has continued the Assad rule 
of pro-Alawite favoritism, using his Alawite minority status to his advantage. By playing 
on sectarianism and a deep historical distrust of the Sunni population, Assad established 
himself as a protector of minorities and thereby secured their unconditional support and 
loyalty. They also manage the elite Sunni business class by offering them a continuation 
of state contracts, foreign exchange and political protection.206 
 External regional actors have infiltrated the domestic political upheaval occurring 
in the Syrian Civil War. Syria is Iran’s closest ally and as such, the 2011 Uprising has 
been met with considerable concern from Tehran. Syria is the “primary hub in Iran’s 
power projection in the Levant.”207 Iran has used Syria as a gateway to fund, train, arm 
and provide logistical assistance to Hamas and Hezbollah. This Iranian-led alliance 
between Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, and most recently, Shi’ite militant groups (such as 
Hamas), has been dubbed the “Axis of Resistance” as they represent the Shi’ite, anti-
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Western, anti-Israel ideology. For Iran, the implications of the Syrian Civil War resulting 
in the removal of Assad from power are catastrophic, threatening to compromise its 
access to Hezbollah, its range of spreading its Islamic revolutionary beliefs, and thus its 
stronghold in the Levant. As Geneive Abdo explains, “Without his [Assad’s] loyalty, the 
second line of defense--Hezbollah and Hamas--would crumble.”208 
 In April of 2011, Iran began provided the Syrian government with aid, training 
and surveillance equipment. Shortly thereafter, direct material assistance and personnel 
was sent from Iran, with Iranian fighters and its own Quds force, from Hezbollah, and 
from the Shi’ite Iraqi community in order to help Syria suppress the protest and rebel 
movement and stay in power.209 Iran has such a high stake in the outcome of Syria that 
they sent the Quds Force’s third in command to train the security services fight against 
the movement.  In addition, the Iranian regime has provided Assad with technologies to 
monitor e-mail, social media and mobile phones.210 The future of Syria is an important 
determinant for Iran and even in the case that Syria does fall, Iran is determined to 
influence the succeeding government. 
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 As the pivot of the Sunni cause, Saudi Arabia has also played a determining role 
in Syrian relations. Since the 1970s, Saudi-Syrian relations have been greatly strained 
with Saudi Arabia viewing the Syrian government with distrust and suspicion. When the 
2011 uprisings occurred, Saudi Arabia took a hardline approach against Assad. At first, 
Saudi’s influence presented itself in more of a subtle quality, as Saudi Arabian King 
Abdullah demanded an end to the killing and bloodshed unleashed by the Syrian regime 
against the population. Following Saudi Arabia’s lead, August 2011 also saw the removal 
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain’s Syrian ambassadors in a move to further protest 
these policies.211 In a statement promoting the Saudi stance, Nawaf Obaid posited that 
Saudi Arabia would continue to resist Iranian involvement in the Syrian civil war, 
"[Saudi Arabia] will be there to stop them wherever they are in Arab countries," he said. 
"We cannot accept Revolutionary Guards running round Homs."212 
Saudi Arabia increased their ground support of the anti-regime movements and 
has provided material weapons and training to the Syrian rebels, prepared to spend 
millions of dollars to arm and train thousands of Syrian fighters. Jordan has been an 
acting portal of Saudi and Gulf equipment donations. In its union with the Wahhabi 
school of thought, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Syrian war has been supported by 
Wahhabi religious clerics, advocating for Sunnis all around the world to support the 
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Syrian rebels by any means necessary.  This tacit support was provided by the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca and by the Saudi grand mufti.213 As aforementioned, Saudi Arabia's 
soft power influence via the Wahhabi doctrine has been a major force of spreading Saudi 
legitimacy to Muslim populations across the globe. There has also been Saudi intent to 
build and strengthen additional Sunni militias, with the aim of backing the future 
leadership of Syria. Saudi Arabia has been working closely with other Sunni nations such 
as Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey to ensure that these objectives are met.214  
Bringing together various opposition forces, Saudi Arabia’s role has contributed 
to the Syrian rebels gains against regime forces and in fighting against Hezbollah in the 
regions closest to Lebanon. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s infiltration of Syria’s civil war has 
catapulted the state into the largest proxy battlefield for the Sunni and Shi’ite conflict. In 
2014, the Meir Amit Intelligence and Information center in Tel Aviv released a study 
revealing there to be between 6,000 to 7,000 Sunni foreign fighters in Syria battling 
Assad and the number of Shi’ite foreigners fighting on Assad’s behalf against Sunni 
forces is estimated to be between 7,000 and 8,000 fighters.215 By providing military 
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weapons, funding, personnel, and religious sectarian rhetoric, Saudi Arabia and Iran has 
widened the Syrian conflict into a microcosm of the Sunni-Shi’ite conflict that has 
become expressed within the context of Saudi Arabia and Iran’s clash for geostrategic 
influence. Perhaps the most significant consequence of the exacerbation of the political 
upheaval in Syria has been the spillover effect into neighboring Iraq and the emergence 
of fundamental terrorist organizations such as ISIS.  
Iraq and the Emerging Jihadist Threat 
Iraqi Civil War 
As explored in the chapter five, sectarian identity in Iraq was institutionalized 
when the new Iraqi government came into political power. Sunni Arabs, who had once 
held the most elite positions of power in the country, were left out of the new government 
system, leaving them with little faith that the Iraqi government is representative or even 
responsive to its needs. In December of 2011, the United States officially withdrew its 
military troops from Iraq, leaving Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, re-elected in 2010, 
free to fully pursue majoritarian government. Maliki immediately embarked on staging 
high profile raids and arrest on prominent Sunni leaders, such as Vice President Tariq al-
Hashemi, forcing them to leave the country and then sentenced them to death in 
absentia.216 
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Maliki focused on creating a strong leadership of a majority, if not sole, Shi’ite 
government assembling loyalists within its most elite political institutions. By 
establishing influence over the Iraqi judiciary, the Iraqi electoral commission, the Central 
Bank, etc., Maliki was able to create a governing system of unchecked political power, 
enabling him to suppress his political rivals while safeguarding his allies. Maliki’s 
consolidation of state power and constant Shi’ite militia attacks against Sunni 
communities has generated serious backlash by the Sunni population. The Sunni 
members who held government positions boycotted cabinet meetings and launched no-
confidence votes. While these tactics generally failed, they also stripped the community 
of what little political influence they had left in the government.  
In 2012, however, Maliki’s actions pressed the Sunni Iraqi population into a broad 
protest movement. In December of 2012, Maliki ordered his security forces to raid the 
home of the “moderate” and secular Sunni Finance Minister, Rafia al-Issawi. This target 
against prominent Sunni members sparked a Sunni protest movement, which renewed 
sectarian violence, with clashes between Sunni and Shi’ite groups continue to worsen. 
 In 2013, concerns over the targeting of Sunnis political rivals propelled Iraqi 
Sunnis to protest. Tens of thousands of Sunni individuals joined the demonstrations, 
setting up camps for over six months in provinces such as Anbar, Ninewa, Salah, ad-Din, 
Diyala and also in Kirkuk and Baghdad.217 The demonstrations eventually evolved into a 
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deeper expression of the Sunni Iraqi’s many unresolved grievances, such as 
disproportionate abuse against Sunni communities and the perception of an unequal 
distribution of power, that escalated when the US forces withdrew from Iraq. In response 
to this protest movement, as seen during the Arab Spring, the Maliki regime increased his 
security forces in order to suppress the movement. In January, the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) fired on crowds in Anbar after protestors threw rocks. Maliki delayed the provincial 
elections in Anbar and Ninewa and in April, an ISF raid on a protest site in Hawija left 
over 200 dead.218 When the protests appeared to fail in producing results, some Iraqis 
began to appeal to the regional Sunni community, calling for the use of force. While there 
is no doubt that Iraq’s Sunni community had genuine and legitimate grievances that they 
faced under Maliki’s time in office, the Iraqi community has entered into a vicious cycle 
of sectarian repression. Since the establishment of the state of Iraq, Iraq’s Sunnis were 
disproportionately empowered by the government, a factor the belied its minority stance. 
In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, this same majoritarian government was 
empowered, with now the Shi’ites in rule at the expense of the Sunni minority. The 
grievances experienced by both Sunni and Shi’ite Iraqis has once again manifested itself 
into Saudi Arabia and Iran’s regional politics. As the battle grounds around Syria and 
Iraq continue to widen, rather than contract, more regional players are making a venture 
in its future. Tensions between Sunnis and Shi’ites have been aggravated more than ever 
as regional powers continue to politicize the ethno-religious identities in their fight for 
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influence. The exploitation of Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian has further weakened and 
catapulted the Iraqi state, attracting radical and fundamentalist elements.   
ISIS 
Emerged from the remnants of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq & al-Sham 
(ISIS) has posed a serious threat to stability, security and development in the Middle 
East. As civil war in Iraq and Syria continues to be exploited by regional powers, the 
conflict has reached unprecedented heights, showing no sign of resolution. As 
populations in the Middle East continue to grow increasingly discontented, jihadist 
organizations exploit these grievances, gaining not only popularity but also legitimacy. 
Inspired by a distinctive ideology, certain extremists believe that the United States 
symbolizes liberalism, democracy and secularism, a political system that is not only in 
direct contradiction to Islam but that its very existence is against Islam. Moreover, certain 
Muslim states and leaders have been infiltrated by this anti-Muslim ideology. Islamic 
fundamentalists hold that these acts of aggression against Islam must be eliminated via 
jihad.219 Generated by increased conflict and chaos in the Middle East, jihadi extremism 
has grown more pronounced in Muslim communities in the region and even around the 
world. This growing extremist that has resulted from the political vacuums in weak and 
failing states make non state actors a clear and present threat that confronts the Middle 
East and the international system.  
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When the uprisings occurred in Syria in 2011, they were initially civil and non-
violent. Eventually, the movement took on violent characteristics and the rebel army was 
created. In addition to Assad’s brutal and ruthless suppression of the 2011 nonviolent and 
pro-democracy struggle, he also released hundreds of prisoners who were Islamists linked 
to al-Qaeda, such as Abu Othman.220 By the end of June 2011, Othman and his fellow 
“graduate” jihadists began to mobilize against Assad, collecting intelligence on Assad's 
security forces and purchasing weapons. In August of 2011, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, 
a young veteran of the Iraq War, had been authorized by his commander, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, to fight against the Alawite Syrian forces, with the intent to bring down the 
Assad regime and establish an Islamic state in its stead. With their first operation an 
attack on a Damascus State Security branch in December, Othman, Golani and their 
fellow al-Qaeda affiliated jihadists formally announced themselves in January of 2012 as 
Jabhat al Nusra.  
While the Free Syrian Army was highly suspicious of al-Nusra’s motives, they 
needed their support as a disciplined, capable and effective fighting force. Many of al-
Nusra’s actions utilized acts of terrorism, such as suicide bombings and various other 
attacks against the regime. Furthermore, al-Nusra’s ideology maintained harsh sectarian 
values, especially against the Alawites, however avoided brutal executions and sectarian 
attacks that Al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) was made unpopular from. While al-Nusra committed 
terrorist attacks, when they were labeled as a terrorist organization, a number of anti-
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government forces protested the designation.221 In April of 2013, in a startling turn of 
events, an audiotape from the AQI emir, Baghdadi, announced that his AQI unit not only 
had created Jabhat al Nusra but that he was merging the two under a single organization, 
ISIS. Golani and al-Qaeda’s leader, Zawahiri, publicly rejected the merger. Al-Nusra, 
quickly divided, however, with many of the foreign fighters called to help fight in Syria, 
the muhajirun, following Baghdadi's edict and joining ISIS.222 ISIS soon after began 
establish its state and in August of 2013, after conquering the city of Raqqa in the 
northeast of Syria from the rebels, made it its capital. ISIS was an even more radicalized 
sect, adhering to the a fundamental Jihadist ideology that enforced women to wear the 
full niqab, made daily prayers mandatory, pronounced other Muslims as infidels and 
carried out strict punishment under the Sharia.  
 Aside from the Saudi-Iranian call for foreign Sunnis and Shi’ites to join the fight 
in Syria, ISIS’ roots link back to the fundamentalist beliefs of al-Wahhab and his 
partnership with the Saud family in the eighteenth century. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is 
using the language of religion to construct the Islamic State with him as the revived 
Caliph.223 While Saudi Arabia has united against ISIS, it is evident that Saudi Arabia's 
innovation and exportation of Wahhabism has created the Salafi creed of ISIS. ISIS’ 
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leadership has expressed their open commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni 
Islam, circulating images of Wahhabi religious textbooks in the schools that it mandates. 
In line with the Wahhabi thinking is ISIS approach to embracing violence to reform 
Muslim states and societies who have fallen into “unbelief.”224 For ISIS fighters, they 
believe that they are involved in struggles that are beyond their own lives, that they must 
embrace the killing of unfaithful Muslims and act against foreign domination in order to 
purify the Islamic community and return to Islam’s Golden Age. 
 As Syria’s civil war has had spillover effects into Iraq, many foreign fighters have 
continued to cross the border into Iraq. Drawn together by the increasingly autocratic and 
sectarian rule of the Iraqi government, with no resolution in sight, ISIS has begun to 
march across Iraq. The fight in Syria provided ISIS with a base of operation and with the 
ability to openly recruit fighters who can move between the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields. 
Sunnis from all across the region and political spectrum are joining on behalf of the 
Sunni faction in the Iraqi civil war. In fact, it is estimated that over 20,000 fighters from 
around the world have joined extremist organizations in Iraq and Syria, around 3,400 
from Western countries.225 On June 10, 2014, ISIS members seized Mosul, Iraq’s second 
largest city and has conquered more territory since then. Major cities that ISIS captured 
but were forced to relinquish include Tikrit, Falluja and the strategic Kurdish town of 
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Kobane. Most recently, in May 2015, the central city of Ramadi fell to ISIS, marking 
another signification conquest. In an analysis regarding ISIS’ progress in Iraq, the 
coalition fighting against ISIS is missing a key aspect in their strategy: ISIS has rooted 
itself within many Sunni communities. For many within the Sunni community in Iraq, 
ISIS represents a means to defend their cause. Sunni leaders have both actively and 
passively enabled ISIS to advance, as one tribal leader explains, Sunni leaders have 
formed their own military council to “defend their areas” while Maliki allowed terrorist 
to overturn “legitimate Sunni resistance.”226 Furthermore, when looking at the 
composition of ISIS fighters, most of those serving directly under Baghdadi are ex-Iraqi 
military and intelligence operators. This is also the case when looking at the number of 
forces in Iraq. With over 15,000 forces in Iraq, the number continues to increase ISIS’ 
popularity and religious authority has allowed them to recruited local men--who have 
already taken up arms in the Sunni struggle--whenever they enter a new town.227 In order 
to understand the full dynamics of the ethno sectarian dimensions in Iraqi society and 
their view of ISIS, Nussaibah Yunis explains,  
As the Iraqi government wages war against the Islamic State, it is severely 
underestimating the extent to which continued, deep-seated mistrust among Iraq’s 
ethnosectarian communities is undermining its effort. Iraqi Shia have largely 
failed to understand the fears that are keeping Iraqi Sunnis away from the fight 
against the radical jihadist group; Iraqi Sunnis have long miscalculated their 
[political] leverage…and have backed themselves into a fatal corner with the 
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Islamic State; and Iraqi Kurds are single-mindedly pursuing a vision of 
independence... standing in the way of cooperation in the war against the Islamic 
State.228 
 
As can be seen, Iranian-Saudi tensions, as expressed in the rhetoric of religious 
legitimacy, has unleashed radicalized forces that have taken on a transnational character 
and is impossible to contain within the physical borders of states.  
Yemen Revisited  
In 2011, the human rights contagion that swept through the Muslim world also 
found a home in Yemen. As previously discussed, Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, 
was an authoritarian leader who repressed economic and civic life. In order to ensure 
government loyalty, Saleh designated the security and military apparatus with his 
relations. Other relatives also established monopolies over tobacco trade, real estate, and 
hotel tourism. Those outside of the family were ensured loyalty via pay offs by both 
Saleh and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia regularly flooded money into Yemeni tribal 
systems in order to keep followers happy and submissive.229 Yemen is a failing state and 
is the poorest state in the Arab World. The Yemeni government’s income has generally 
been kept by the ruling family and was not invested into state institutions or establishing 
any civilian infrastructure. This left Yemen with an unemployment rate of 35 percent and 
                                                
228 Ibid  
 
229 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), pgs. 69 
 
 139 
 
 
 
over half of its citizens illiterate.230 In the recent years, Yemen has also had the 
unfortunate position of serving as the home base for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. 
 When the Arab Uprisings occurred in Yemen, Saleh was unable sustain control 
over the state apparatus and in late 2011 a political transition began to occur. By 2011, 
despite its defeat by Saudi forced, the Houthis movement had been transformed into an 
organized and disciplined militia. Continuously gaining popularity in the North of 
Yemen, when the 2011 uprisings occurred, the Houthis movement reworked the 
movement’s rhetoric to support revolution and the youth protestors in Sana’a rather than 
on religion and the Islamic revolutionary principles that it was founded upon. Since 2011, 
the Houthis have been on the rise and in January of 2015, the organization pressured the 
country’s acting President, Abd Rabbu Mansour, to resign. Their continuous expansion 
has allowed them to effectively seize control over Yemen’s capital.231 The recent political 
instability of the Republic of Yemen, instigated by the Houthis rebels, may push the 
country into a full-scale war. While many Yemenis support the Houthi cause, they also 
continue to face resistance from former President Saleh, Sunni tribes in the Marib oil 
province, and other various tribal and political movements. The political instability has 
also pushed the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran to become very “hot.” 
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Since the Houthis expansion, Iran has been cited to be smuggling weapons into 
Yemen. For instance, in March of 2012, The New York Times cited U.S. military and 
intelligence officials stating that the Quds force was supplying the Houthis rebels with 
AK-47 rifles, rocket grenades, and other arms. In January 2013, a shipment bearing 
Iranian markings was seized just off the coast of Yemen with weapons including air 
missiles and C-4 explosives.232 In March 2015, Saudi Arabia moved in with airstrikes 
against the Houthis. In response, the Iranian government has condemned the Saudi-led 
offensive against the Houthis. In both April and May; Iran had sent aid ships in a direct 
challenge to the Saudi and US blockade of Yemen’s ports. The first attempt by Iran to 
send in aid failed, however this time around Iran asked its navy to provide special 
protection for the ship, promising retaliation if the ship, the Iran Shahed is prevent from 
its mission. The ship carried 2,500 tons of aid and was bound for the Shi’ite Houthis 
controlled port. The conflict in Yemen is important to both Iran and Saudi Arabia. As a 
border-country of Saudi Arabia, Yemen constitutes a national security matter. While the 
Iranian government still insists that it does not support any foreign intervention in 
Yemen, many of its actions have shown that Yemen might be Iran’s latest quest for 
regional power against the Saudis. As Yemen continues to be torn apart by war, the 
future of Yemen is left uncertain. 
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Conclusion 
Amidst the upheaval of the Arab Uprisings, the Saudi-Iranian competition has 
been greatly intensified. Their struggle for regional dominance continues to challenge the 
power dynamics of the Middle East. In their quest for influence, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
became involved in the regions domestic politics following the crash of popular and 
peaceful protest. Supporting opposing factions within the conflict, Saudi Arabia and Iran 
engaged in proxy wars from the Levant to the Gulf, contributing vast resources, including 
funds, arms, training, public support, and even personnel in order to improve relations 
with what they hope will become the transitioning leadership. In the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring, both Saudi Arabia and Iran increased their politicization of sectarian 
rhetoric in order to legitimate their claims to Islamic leadership and their role in the 
domestic politics of the state. Saudi-Iranian proxy conflicts and military interventions 
have taken place in Bahrain, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Furthermore, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia’s proxy wars in the region provided a fertile ground for the rise of extremist 
groups, such as ISIS, to emerge as powerful players. If left unmitigated, these jihadist 
non-state actors have the potential to change the map of the Middle East.  
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Conclusion 
In order to comprehend the current tensions occurring in the Middle East, the 
central question of this research project is, “Can the regional conflict between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran be framed as the New Middle East cold war?” With the many vast 
implications of an ongoing cold war in the Middle East, this question is crucially 
important. 
 To attain the answer as to whether this description of Saudi-Iranian relations is 
applicable, this thesis analyzed four different time periods: 1924-1979; 1979-2003; 2003-
2011; 2011-Present. These periods provided us with insight regarding Saudi-Iranian 
relations during the times when they engaged in friendly bilateral relations and when they 
were archrivals. Examining these time periods was critical in order to deduce if Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are involved in a current cold war and, if so, what the defining moments 
were that turned these two states from collaborative partners to embittered cold war 
rivals. Based on various Cold War literature and the theoretical framework of a cold war 
defined in chapter two, there are seven dimensions that this thesis has identified that can 
 143 
 
 
 
be applied to Saudi Arabia and Iran’s relations in order to highlight the current reality of 
the Middle East.  
One dimension assessed was religious and political ideology as the collective 
national memories of conflict between the competing Islamic ideologies continue to sway 
foreign policies and diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Cold War 
between the United States and Soviet Union was a largely political contestation. The 
struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, however, while imbued with strategic and 
geopolitical underpinnings, is largely influenced by religious and ethnic ideology. Each 
states’ collective narrative reinforces the differences between the two states. The 
competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran represent two opposing aspirations for 
Islamic leadership with two vastly differing political systems. The clash is between Saudi 
Arabia, representing Sunni Islam and its Wahhabi interpretations and Iran, representing 
Shi’ite Muslims through its Khomeini doctrines. The conflict between Wahhabi Saudi 
Arabia and Khomeini Iran is not the result of an ancient schism that exists between the 
Sunnis and the Shi’ites. Rather, it is the byproduct of centuries of political and religious 
contestation that existed between empires that now has manifested itself into the politics 
of these modern-nation states. 
Another dimension identified as central to the Middle East cold war was 
diplomacy. Since the inception of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
have reverted from friendly bilateral relations to severe conflict. During Saudi Arabia’s 
formative years as a modern nation state and under the era of the Shah, relations tended 
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to lean towards collaboration, as both Saudi Arabia and Iran’s collective identity 
influenced its foreign policy objects to protect the status quo. Most recently, heightened 
tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran ascribes back to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
In an attempt to export the Iranian-style theocratic uprisings around the Middle East, the 
Iranian Ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini, sought to delegitimize Saudi Arabia, perceiving 
the monarchy as an extension of American interference. This has engaged Saudi Arabia 
and Iran in a security dilemma. Saudi Arabia was already an influential government in 
Islam as the “custodian of the two holy sites” and viewed Iranian actions and rhetoric as a 
threat to its influence in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia developed a foreign policy 
strategy to contain and counter Iran, as seen via the formation of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, as well as through its funding of Iraq during the 1980’s Iran-Iraq war. On its 
end, Iran continued to look for ways to challenge the regional order, such as supporting 
Hezbollah and Hamas and allying with Syria’s Assad regime. Although relations were 
normalizing during the 1990’s, the 2003 U.S. led invasion of Iraq provided Iran with the 
opportunity to strengthen pro-Iranian Shi’ite militia groups and back a Shi’ite ruling 
government. The Arab Uprisings further exacerbated Saudi-Iranian tensions as Saudi 
Arabia and Iran continue to take advantage of the security vacuums of weak states in the 
Middle East as a means to compete for influence in the failing countries’ domestic 
politics. 
The third dimension identified was the role of alliances, both internal (within the 
region) and external. During the formative years of the Islamic Republic, Iran, with the 
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exception of the Assad regime in Syria and the rising power of Hezbollah in Lebanon, 
found itself highly isolated in a containment policy enacted by many of its surrounding 
Sunni Arab states. The 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq changed the power of balance 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran’s regional influence has significantly increased as its 
allies in the region have accumulated power.  
Saudi Arabia’s greatest foreign alliance has been the United States. First 
established through its oil industry partnership and then through security and government 
agreements during the Russian-American Cold War, Saudi Arabia and the United States 
established a close alliance that has lasted for over 70 years. Saudi Arabia also has built 
significant alliances with the European Union, Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states. 
Additionally, although there are various competing influences within the Sunni world 
(such as between Saudi Arabia and Turkey), as tensions with Iran continue to grow, 
Sunni players may form a greater coalition to counter growing Iranian influence in the 
Arab World. For example, the recent Saudi military intervention in Yemen drew in 
regional players such as Turkey and Pakistan. Powerful countries in the region currently 
do not want to be entangled in the geopolitical and sectarian struggle between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. However as regional affairs grow tenser, Sunni countries are unlikely to 
remain uninvolved. 
A fourth dimension explained was economic. The oil reserves that both countries 
have at their disposal have allowed them to fund and export their rivalry and ideology 
throughout the entire Islamic world. The relationship between oil profits and the role of 
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Wahhabism in the Middle East is specifically important to note as oil profits have 
allowed Wahhabism to have a preeminent position of strength in the Middle East region. 
As the “Guardian of the two holy sites,” Saudi Arabia’s creation of the Wahhabi brand of 
Sunni Islam via its religious training and soft power influence, has garnered the country a 
legitimacy endorsed throughout most of the Sunni world. The oil profits from wealth 
have provided Saudi Arabia with the funds to spread Wahhabism transnationally. 
Additionally, Saudi Arabia has led the United States, European Union, and several 
individual countries to implement sanctions against the Iranians for human rights abuses 
and for their nuclear program.  
Another dimension that parallels the Cold War between the United States and 
Soviet Union was the arms race. Specific to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is the nuclear 
issue. While both Saudi Arabia and Iran have weak conventional forces and arms, both 
countries have invested in researching and developing nuclear weapons. The 
development of a “Shi’ite bomb” may cause Saudi Arabia to develop its own nuclear 
program. The recent nuclear accord with Iran may be catapulted Saudi Arabia’s urgency 
to develop its own nuclear program, viewing the Nuclear deal as the U.S. providing 
Iran’s nuclear program with its “stamp of approval.” As Iran’s main ideological and 
strategic rival, Saudi Arabia has announced its plan to build its own nuclear program with 
a minimum of 16 nuclear reactors as a way to bridge this gap.233 Saudi Arabia believes 
that it has the resources to purchase nuclear capabilities from an outside source. As Saudi 
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Arabia has a history of acting clandestinely in the nuclear arena, the production of a 
Sunni bomb to counter the Shi’ite bomb remains a distinct and concerning possibility.  
 The sixth important dimension considered was proxy conflicts. Proxy wars are 
fought as a way for the rival powers to retain— or expand— their control in a given 
region. Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to exploit the region’s weak states in a series of 
proxy wars ranging from conflicts in the Gulf and the Levant, from Iraq to Lebanon. 
These proxy wars are dangerous, as they tend to escalate conflicts for protracted time 
periods, disrupt regional stability and heighten mutual fears.  
Lastly, the seventh dimension analyzed was Saudi Arabia and Iran’s involvement 
in wars. While proxy wars provide these great regional powers with the ability to 
indirectly try to achieve their aims during the conflict, there are also cases where one or 
both powers directly intervene in accordance with its interests. Iran is heavily involved in 
Syria and Iraq and the Saudis have been heavily involved in Bahrain and Yemen. 
In revisiting the cold war dimensions, we saw how the Saudi-Iranian rivalry 
measured in comparison to Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union 
Cold War. While there are distinct and important differences, such as that the rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran is between regional powers and not superpowers and the 
arms race is mainly a nuclear race and not part of the technological imperative that 
existed between the United States and Soviet Union, it is clear that many of the 
dimensions do compare. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 2003 U.S. led invasion of Iraq, 
and the most recent Arab Uprisings have launched the Middle East into a new cold war. 
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Therefore, in order to understand how the competing interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran 
continue to affect the Middle East, it is useful to apply a cold war framework.  
Implications for the United States 
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are key players in the Middle East. In their quest to 
control different parts of the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran have divided the Middle East 
into two armed camps on the basis of political ideology in seeking regional allies. Saudi 
Arabia and Iran are divided by long-standing structural tensions. Each has aspirations for 
Islamic leadership, and each possesses different visions of regional order. It is beneficial 
to view the conflict in terms of the aims and goals of Iran and Saudi Arabia in addition to 
how these two regimes continue to use Islam as an instrument to further their political 
power to become the ultimate hegemon in the Middle East. Though the competition 
between these two states is enduring, paying attention to the rivalry is now principally 
crucial. This rivalry is defining the strategic landscape of the Middle East, threatening 
U.S. National Security interests and endlessly challenging U.S. foreign policies in the 
region.  
 A significant implication of the Middle East cold war is the effect of ideology on 
the region. As seen during the U.S. Cold War with the Soviet Union, the role of ideology 
was part of an all-encompassing zero-sum game. Conflict and competition between the 
two rival countries touched essentially every issue in the immediate post-World War II 
period; the Cold War lasted for four decades. The cold war between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran is part of the larger war in the Middle East, and at the same time, is a reflection of an 
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old conflict between sects and states. Hence, it can only be assumed that Saudi Arabia 
and Iran’s continued capitalization of weakened political institutions will have similar 
influential effects on security, stability and economic growth in the Gulf and wider 
Middle East, with protracted conflicts that will last decades. Saudi Arabia and Iran have 
enormous influence, both economically and culturally, and their bitter rivalry has already 
played out all across the region, from Iraq to Lebanon. Stability in the Middle East is 
integral to safeguarding vital U.S. interests and key objectives in the region. Thus, one 
key implication is that the U.S. will be unable to focus its full attention on its pivot to 
Asia and will be required to continue to maintain a policy of long-term engagement in the 
Middle East.   
The United States will also need to be aware that the tensions and differences that 
exist between Saudi Arabia and Iran will be reflected in many other regional countries. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s conflict is part of a larger war that engulfs the entire Middle East. 
While these tensions are old and have remained relatively peaceful, underlying factions 
do exist. Violent conflict between the Sunnis and Shi’ites emerges when political leaders 
who seek some form of political prize exploit these identities. In their struggle for 
regional hegemony, Saudi Arabia and Iran fuel and encapsulate the Sunni-Shi’ite 
conflict. The New Middle East cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran will inevitably 
result in a spillover affect of this conflict. We have already begun seeing this in the civil 
war conflict in Iraq and the bloody sectarian civil war that is dominating Syria. These 
cold war enemies have serious military, economic, political and social costs. Therefore, 
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the Untied States will need to generate a multifaceted solution that incorporates methods 
of defense, diplomacy and development in order to prevent the conflict from escalating 
further and managing or ending the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.    
Another threat to U.S National security interests is the rise of non-state actors and 
religious extremists. Currently, the role of non-state religious extremist actors are being 
driven by the sectarian policies and ideologies of the Sunni and Shi’ite regimes with no 
outlet in sight. Although the phenomenon of terrorism is not new, it has reached greater 
and unprecedented heights in the past few years, specifically jihadi extremism. Inspired 
by a distinctive ideology, certain Islamic extremists believe that the United States 
symbolizes liberalism and democracy, a political system that is not only in direct 
contradiction to Islam, but that is an act of aggression against Islam that must be 
eliminated via revolutionary force, jihad. The political vacuums created by Saudi Arabia 
and Iran’s sectarian policies in Muslim communities and around the world has allowed 
for jihadist organizations to exploit grievances, allowing them to gain not only popularity 
but also legitimacy. Religious extremists who exploit terrorism as a political tool are a 
top danger facing the United States. Various research reports indicate that states that are 
engaged in ongoing interstate rivalries have incentives to support terrorism as a means of 
advancing their power and influence.  
Iran is a known state sponsor of terrorism through groups such as Hezbollah, 
Hamas, the Houthis Rebels in Yemen, and other such groups. Saudi Arabia upholds the 
image of a Sunni defender. In attempting to create a strong Sunni identity throughout 
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Islamic world, Saudi Arabia has pushed Wahhabism towards a concerning direction that 
continues to have dire consequences in the region. Many regional experts provide 
evidence of a causal link between sectarian policies and Sunni extremism. The Saudi 
petrodollar enabled Saudi Arabia to drive a geographical distribution of Salafism, the 
export version of Wahhabism. Vali Nasr writes, “the band of radical Islam that began 
spreading across Central Asia and the Caucasus in the 1990s...was a Sunni radicalism 
born of the deliberate Saudi policy of containing Iran.”234 Jihadist attacks on the United 
States has already led the country to have two protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
that has resulted in an immense cost of human life and dollars. As civil wars in Syria and 
Iraq continue, to lure of violent jihad and the lethality of terrorist attacks will continue to 
increase, presenting non-state actors as the preeminent threat to U.S. interests and its 
national security.  
Thus, in order for the U.S. to understand how the competing interests of these two 
nations affects U.S. national security, it is useful to apply the framework of a cold war 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran are key players in the Middle 
East and their aspirations for regional hegemony have predisposed the nations to be 
entrapped in a state of everlasting hostility. In their quest to control different parts of the 
Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Iran have divided the region into two armed camps on the 
basis of political ideology in seeking regional allies. Saudi Arabia and Iran are divided by 
long-standing structural tensions. Each has aspirations for Islamic leadership, and each 
                                                
234 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future, Reprint ed. (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 158 
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possesses different visions of regional order. Whereas Iran regards Saudi Arabia as 
America’s proxy and a buffer against Iran’s rightful primacy in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia 
worries about Iran’s asymmetric power and regional ambitions (especially its expanding 
influence in post-Saddam Iraq and its alleged pursuit of a nuclear weapon). It is more 
beneficial to view the conflict in terms of the aims and goals of Iran and Saudi Arabia 
and how these two regimes continue to use Islam as an instrument to further their 
political power and become the ultimate hegemon in the Middle East. Therefore, the fall 
of Saddam Hussein and the events leading up to the 2011 Arab Uprisings have changed 
the regional security paradigm of the Middle East and have further catapulted the two 
nations to support their proxies through funding, military arms, soldiers and by 
encouraging sectarianism. It will be important for the United States to remain aware of 
political changes that will continue to occur in the region as a result of the new Middle 
East cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
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